Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2002

In the Matter of the Adoption of Halloway v.
Navajo Nation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard B. Johnson; Attorneys for Respondent.
Mary Ellen Sloan; Craig Dorsay; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Halloway v. Navajo Nation, No. 20519.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2006

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

m
UTAH SUPREME
COURT
I BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT!
KFU
45.9
.89
DOCKET Nd.fl22SL2.

TW

^HF UPREME COURT
THE STATE T ^ * U

IN xhiL MATTER OF THE .<.
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY,
-

in^iq

-,(-i v ^ a r c

M'~ - --

of aae..

-.-r^Oon - BRIEF *-, APPELLANTS

marj Ellen Sican
9 Exchange Place,
..._'. c i„j
0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone- ^ n n "-^-5644

Richard
F

;;

?•••:

'-rsv-.'* i
"•

>

P r o v e , Utah
84603
Attorney for Resr*

Craig Dorsav
P.O. Drawer 2010

Window Pock, Arize::a
86515
T e l e p h o n e : (602) S™ 1-6936
A t t o r n e y s for Apr.-^llant

JUL. ->^1985
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Clerk. Sup:-^--0.c««1f Utah
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

oooOooo
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY,
A person under eighteen years
of age.

No. 20519

Navajo Nation, Appellant.
—00O00—

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Mary Ellen Sloan
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8644
Richard B. Johnson
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for Respondent

Craig Dorsay
P.O. Drawer 2010
Window Rock, Arizona 86515
Telephone: (602) 871-6936
Attorneys for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO APPEAL
i

i

i

n

>

ii

h

i

i .

Navajo Nation - Appellant
Dan and Patricia Carter - Respondents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

3

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED

7.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

8

STATEMENT OF FACTS .

Q

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COUP.T WAS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE THE CONSENT
TO ADOPTION EXECUTED BY THE NATURAL
MOTHER

12

POINT II: AN INDIVIDUAL ADULT INDIAN
DOMICILED ON A RESERVATION CANNOT
WAIVE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF
THE TRIBE IN AN ADOPTION PROCEEDING

13

POINT Til: THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING
THAT REMEDIAL AND REHABILITATIVE
SERVICES HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO THE
MOTHER AND PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL WAS
IN ERROR

20

POINT IV: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY
DENYING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
ORDER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COURT

24

POINT V: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN
IT PULED THAT THE STATE OF UTAH FAD
JURISDICTION UNDER THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT OVER THE ADOPTION
PROCEEDING
POINT VI: THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

COURT TERMINATING THE PARENTAL
RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL MOTHER WITHOUT A FINDING OF UNFITNESS WAS IN
ERROR

'..'•'

CONCLUSION

42
49

ADDENDUM
Exhibit "A" - Letter from Dr. Mueller . . . . . . .

A-l

Exhibit "B" - Opinion of the Solicitor to the
Courts of the Navajo Nation, No. 83-10,
September 19, 1983

A-2

Exhibit "C" - Consent to Adoption, May 30, 1980. . .

A-8

Exhibit "D" - Minute Entry, May 30, 1980

A-9

Exhibit "E" - Ruling of July 14, 1982

A-10

Exhibit "F" - Ruling of October 6, 1983

A-ll

Exhibit "G" - Decision of January 28, 1985

A-15

Exhibit "H" - Order of Navajo District Court,
October 12, 1984

A-25

Exhibit "I" - Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines,
44 Fed.Reg. 67584, November 26, 1979

A-29

Exhibit "J" - Indian Child Welfare Act,
25 U.S.C. §1901 - §1963

A-42

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES;
Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324
P.2d 773 (1958)

14, 17, 33, 38

Application of Puget Sound Pilots Assn., 385
P.2d 711 (Wash. 1963)

27

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
48 L.Ed.2d 710, 96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976)

32

.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J.-3Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Carlson v. Brown, 576 P.2d 1387
(Ariz. App. 1978)

26

Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 433 A.2d 1363
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)

44

Connolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556, 7 L.Ed
518 (1829)

38

Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S.
103, 84 L.Ed.2d 845, 103 S.Ct. 986 (1983)

31

Espinoza v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co.,
624 P.2d 162 (Or. App.), aff'd. 635 P.2d 638
(Or. 1980)

26

Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 47 L.Ed.2d
106, 96 S.Ct. 943 (1976)
14, 15, 29, 30
Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 59 L.Ed. 360,
35 S.Ct. 164 (1915)

31

Guardianship of Baby Boy M, 135 Cal. Rptr. 866
"
(Cal. App. 1977) ^~7

43

Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977)

41

In re Adoption of Marsolf, 434 P.2d 1010
(Kan. 1967)

26

In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 473 A.2d 1021
(Pa.Super. 1984)

46

In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1981)

46

In re Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash.App. 1982)

48

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982)

....

43, 44, 45, 49

In re Matter of Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079
(Or. App. 1975) .

30, 31

Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119 (Utah 1976). . .

44,

Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976)

...

Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, 704 F.2d 1088
(9th Cir. 1983)
Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d
507, 91 S.Ct. 480 (1971)

-4-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45
45
31
16

K. N. v. Cades, 432 A.2d 1010
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)

34, 35

Matter of Adoption of Baby Child, 700 P.2d 198
(N.M.App. 1985)

17, 33, 39

Matter of Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334
(Wash. 1976)

30, 31, 36

Matter of Adoption of T.M.H., 608 P.2d 130
(Mont. 1980)

36

Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action
No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981),
cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982)
16, 21, 33, 39, 40, 48
Matter of Charles, 688 P.2d 1354 (Or. App. 1984) . . . .

21

Matter of Guardianship of D.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d
278 (S.D. 1980)

39

Matter of J.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1982)

48

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S.
164, 36 L.Ed.2d 129, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (1973)
...

29, 32

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,
36 L.Ed.2d 114, 93 S.Ct. 1267 (1973)
Montoya v. Collier, 512 P.2d 684 (N.M. 1973)

29
....

37

National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe,
53 U.S.L.W. 4649 (June 3, 1985)

30

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983)

29

Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)

43

Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176 Pth Cir. 1980)
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
L.Ed.2d 106, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978)

. . . .

31, 38

.

29

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 102 S.Ct. 1388
(1982)
43, 47
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977)

-5-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

State v. Blum, 463 P.2d 367 (Or.App. 1970).

45

State ex rei Juvenile Dept. v. Chapin,
675 P.2d 831 (Or.App. 1984) . .

45

State, In Interest of E. v. J.T. ,
578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978)

44, 46

State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407,
464 P.2d 395 (1970)

44, 45, 46

Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1973)

...

31

Triebelhorn v. Tuzanski,. 37C P. 2d 757
(Idaho 1962)

26

Unruh v. Truck, Ins. Exchange, 498 P.2d 1063
(Calif. 1972)

26

Utah Depart, of Bus. Reg, v. Public Service
Commission, 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979)
Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228
(Md. App. 1975)

14, 26
15, 16, 30, 36

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 106,
96 S.Ct. 943 (1976)

15, 30

Wisconsin Band of Potowatonies v. Houston, 393
F. Supp. 719 (D.W.D. Mich. 1973) . . .
15, 16, 30, 31, 38
Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
8 L.Ed.2d 783 (1832)

29

Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1968)

32

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg.
67584 (Introduction)
21, 32, 33, 47, 48, 49

-6-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Foster Children In The Courts, 255, M. Hardin
(American Bar Ass'n. Nat'l. Legal Resources
Center~for Child Advocacy and Protection,
1983)

24

House of Representatives, Report No. 1386, 95th
Congress, Second Session, reprinted at U.S.
Code Congressional & Administrative News,
7530 (1978)
15, 21, 23, 30, 38
Parent and Child, 59 Am. Jr. 2d 90-107, §8-24
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971)

35, 40
14, 32, 33, 34

TABLE OF STATUTES CITED
25 U.S.C. 51901
25 U.S.C. §1902
25 U.S.C. §1903(a) (iv)
25 U.S.C. 51903(b)
25 U.S.C. 51911(a)
25 U.S.C. 51911(d)
25 U.S.C. 51912(d)
25 U.S.C. §1912(f)
25 U.S.C. §1913(a)
25 U.S.C. §1920
25 U.S.C. §1921
555-86-1, Article II, U.C.A
578-42-2(5), U.C.A
578-45-4.2, U.C.A

-7- Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
32
12
20
30
18, 25
20 21, 23, 24
47
13
42
49
27
41
41

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
]

*

•"

- :r :r.ate

. :
t.> Hie s
c h i J

r

*~ <- r r i nf• ~*",

I j,

-*-"'*

~

r e s idu i
* v~'

>

:

' '

, , L - -U ^ t o d i a l

suiDS^ <~^
i.-

shifted

*~r "

..

r

ust;:

. . ; >.

*

.

- ; '"he * r \a*
the

tribal

r iqhts

•

'

* r

^e

indin^
T^-*-*-.,,

*M •

fc

•,

"^ ^a^,. r -»i

v

f.-'

,'ic. ,

-^r-

r f --ah?

t

* he

-. , * * - ' 4 P n i a , o f

-f u * *

f

Jerri s i ' **

United

*

• -

-\h i !>

t,v:f -

j

:

.
or.err

+

ot

^

^ *-<-.rm?

r

.

^

'*ah,

:^«i

**'":r

' i/re I ; r - s s

-? f e * : - j e P

.r

*-nt-

* - T : : 1°

petit

.». - ^ -

• 3* '

-•

Fm I. I F

l\--l*circr
^-.3t.lv.-

j-<

abandonr^nr

rne

indinq

f :

:^ r *• .-?

idtural

c< \ s t ^ : . ; t e

cou

— t , *--- r .

A-

grandmother?

rosi^:
; v .

<2

"M

jr.*

* *

-•

^ ~* i *

-

motht-r

i n J i jr.,

~ ^H S e r T T a +~" ^

M r i

* .-.'r.*
.,f

v.iv. o

* *** *• he

'

consent

: „. . e - ;

/n't,

the

the*

Jcnstitutj-cii

-;wL- .wn
-A-

<"d

ui

trie

States?
, . :i
I'-'vi^-'

*• * -'>- na* u i :

4 that

r e h a M 1 i f a t ' ^e

mother

and „ad

,net feet;ve?

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

proved

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reference is made throughout this Brief to the Transcript of
the Hearing of April 7, 1983

(hereinafter "Transcript I"), and

the Transcript of the Hearing of October 22, 1984

(hereinafter

"Transcript 11").
1.
May

Jeremiah Halloway

(hereinafter "Jeremiah") was born on

14, 1977 to Cecelia Saunders, an enrolled member of the

Navajo Tribe domiciled on the Navajo reservation.
enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe.

Jeremiah is an

Cecelia Saunders testified

that Ernest Yazzie, Jr., an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe,
was the father of Jeremiah.
2.

(Transcript I p. 18).

Cecelia provided primary care to Jeremiah during the

first six months of his life.

(Transcript I, p. 19).

Cecelia

then transferred care of Jeremiah to the maternal grandmother,
Bessie Begay, who was the primary caretaker of Jeremiah until he
was removed from the reservation.
3.
vation

(Transcript I, p. 119).

In March, 1980, Jeremiah was removed from the on-reserhome of the maternal grandmother, Bessie

maternal aunt, Polly Ann Dick.

Begay, by a

The grandmother was not present

at the time of removal, and did not consent to the removal.

The

oral consent of the natural mother, Cecelia Saunders, was relayed
to Polly Dick by another sister.

(Transcript I, pp. 58-59, pp.

67-68).

-9-
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4.

The Navajo Tribe was not informed of the removal of

Jeremiah from the reservation.
5.

(Transcript I, p. 63.

Jeremiah was placed by Polly Dick in the home of Dan and

Patricia Carter for adoptive placement on March 23, 1980.

Dan

and Patricia Carter knew that Jeremiah was to be removed from the
reservation for placement with them for approximately one month
before the removal actually occurred.
6.

(Transcript I, p. 78).

On May 30, 1980, Cecelia Saunders appeared in the Fourth

Judicial District Court for Utah County and executed a Consent to
Adoption.

By minute entry, Judge David Sam ordered counsel for

Dan and Patricia Carter to obtain the consent of the Navajo Tribe
before

permitting

the

adoption

to

proceed.

See,

Addendum

Exhibits "D" & "E", pp. A-9, 10.
7.

On

that

the

domicile of Jeremiah was that of Dan and Patricia Carter.

The

court stated:

July

14, 1982, Judge

David

Sam

ruled

"This finding is based upon the fact that the

child's residence appears to have been voluntarily and purposely
removed from the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation to
the petitioners."
8.

See, Addendum, Exhibit "E", p. A-10.

On October 6, 1983, Judge David Sam entered additional

findings on the issue of the domicile of Jeremiah:
3. The Court finds that the relocation of the
child with the petitioners was done with the
intent to transfer to the Carters full parental
rights as it relates to the child and with the
further intent to abandon all parental rights in
the child.

-10-
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4,
The Court finds further that the natural
mother and family have abandoned the child and
•that prior to the Court's awarding of temporary
custody of the minor child to the petitioners on
July 14, 1982, the petitioners stood in the
position of loco parentis to Jeremiah Halloway.
See, Addendum, Exhibit "F", A-12.
9.

On October 12, 1984, the District Court of the Navajo

Nation for Window Rock found that, pursuant to Navajo common law
and statute, the domicile of Jeremiah has at all times remained
within the boundaries of the Navajo reservation, and that the
Navajo Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction under tribal statutes and
common law and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to determine
the custody of Jeremiah Halloway.

See, Addendum, Exhibit "H M , p.

A-25.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The State of Utah and the Fourth Judicial District Court
were without jurisdiction under both the U.S. Constitution and
the

Indian

Child

Welfare

Act

to

entertain

proceeding involving Jeremiah Halloway.

a

state

adoption

The District Court had

no jurisdiction to receive the consent to adoption executed by
the natural mother.

Remedial and rehabilitative services were

not provided to the mother and were not necessary for her to
provide adequate parenting of Jeremiah.

The Order of the Navajo

Nation was entitled to full faith and credit by the District

-11-
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Court under

the

Indian Child Welfare Act

and

the

Interstate

Compact. --•

AGRUMENT
'•" •

•

•

<

POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE THE CONSENT TO
ADOPTION EXECUTED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER.
In May, 1980, the Carters paid

for Cecelia

travel to Utah to execute a consent to adoption.

Saunders

to

Cecelia orig-

inally consented on the reservation to the removal of Jeremiah
for foster placement in March, 1980, and was informed approximately one month later by her sister, Polly Ann Dick, that Polly
had placed Jeremiah for adoption.
The consent to adoption was executed on May 30, 1980 in the
district

court.

Cecelia

Saunders

was

not

advised

to obtain

independent legal counsel and consulted only with the Carters'
attorney.
Act

Cecelia has testified that the Indian Child Welfare

(25 U.S.C. §1901, et seq. , hereinafter ICWA) was not ex-

plained to her.

(See, also, Reservation of Consent, April 30,

1982).
The ICWA confirms that Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation.
U.S.C. §1903 (a) (iv).

A voluntary consent

25

"shall not be valid

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court
of competent jurisdiction".

25 U.S.C. 51913(a).

Jeremiah was

clearly domiciled on the reservation at the time the consent to
adoption was executed, even under the rulings of the district
court in this case, since he had originally been removed only for
temporary foster placement, only two months had passed (March 23,
1980 to May 30, 1980), and no intent to terminate parental rights
had been formalized.
In such a situation the only "court of competent jurisdiction" to receive Cecelia's consent was the tribal court, since
the tribe had "jurisdiction exclusive as to any state" over any
adoption proceeding involving Jeremiah while he was domiciled on
the reservation.

The consent to adoption executed by Cecelia in

front of the district court was, therefore, not valid under the
express terms of the ICWA since it was not executed before a
"court of competent

jurisdiction" and hence could not act to

confer subject matter jurisdiction on the State over Jeremiah
Halloway.
POINT II, AN INDIVIDUAL ADULT INDIAN WHO IS
DOMICILED ON AN INDIAN RESERVATION CANNOT
WAIVE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBE
IN AN ADOPTION PROCEEDING.
Cecelia Saunders at all relevant times during this proceeding resided on and was domiciled within the Navajo reservation,
Bessie Begay, the maternal grandmother of Jeremiah, also resided

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and was domiciled exclusively within the boundaries of the Navajo
reservations

It is axiomatic that a child born out of wedlock

takes the domicile of the mother with whom it lives and retains
that domicile until a new one is lawfully acquired.

Application

of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d 773, 775 (1958); Pestatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §22, comment c

(1971).

It is,

therefore, undisputed that Jeremiah was domiciled on the reservation at least until the consent to adoption was signed on May 30,
1980, either by living with his mother, Id..,

or with his grand-

mother as a blood relative under the in loco parentis doctrine.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §22, comment i.
The

District

Court

ruled

that

the

actions

of

Cecelia

Saunders waived the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo tribe
over

Jeremiah

by

transferring

his

jurisdiction, to the State of Utah.
Cecelia's

consent

to

adoption,

domicile, and

thus

tribal

This decision was based on

her

alleged

abandonment

of

Jeremiah and intent to transfer parental rights to the Carters.
This ruling is incorrect because an individual cannot waive the
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribe while remaining domiciled on
the reservation.

Utah Dept. of Bus. Peg., etc. v. Public Service

Commission, 602 P. 2d 696, 699 (Utah 1979).
This principle was enunciated in Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382, 47 L.Ed.2d 106, 96 S.Ct. 943 (1976), where adult
tribal members residing on a reservation attempted to invoke and

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

consent

to the

jurisdiction

of a state court

proceedings involving an Indian child.

in an adoption

The United States Supreme

Court confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe over the
child, holding that such a ruling benefited the class of Indian
people "by furthering the congressional policy of Indian selfgovernment."

Fisher,

applies

an

when

424

U.S.

attempted

390-391.

transfer

of

The

same

parental

principle
rights

to

non-Indians by a mother who resides on a reservation is involved,
because the same principles of self-government are involved in
that the tribe has a compelling interest in determining whether
the placement of the child is in his or her best interests under
tribal law or custom.

25 U.S.C. §1901(3).

See, Williams v. Lee,

358 U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S.Ct. 269 (1959); Wakefield v.
Little Light, 347 A.2d 228, 237 (Md. App. 1975).
Congress expressly confirmed this principle in the ICWA in
the Act's exclusive jurisdiction section, 25 U.S.C. §1911 (a).

In

the legislative history to this section, Congress stated that the
section confirmed the holdings of certain Indian child custody
cases such as Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies v. Houston, 393
F.Supp.

719

(D.W.D. Mich.

1973);

Wakefield ,v. Little

Light,

supra; and H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th CONG., 2d SESS. 21, reprinted
at 1978 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7544.
specifically

held

that

an

individual

jurisdiction

by

consent

on

the

state

Indian
court
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These cases

cannot
because

confer
of

the

significant tribal interest in "control over the custody of their
children","^Wakefield

v.

Little

Light,

347

A.2d

at

237-38;

Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies v, Houston 393 F.Supp. at 738, and
both cases involved the custody of Indian children by non-Indian
custodians.
unless

Nor may a tribe confer its jurisdiction on a state

express

federal

law

is

followed.

Wisconsin

Band

of

Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. at 733; Kennerly v. District
Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971).
would

certainly

be

anomalous

if

an

Indian

cannot

It

confer

jurisdiction in an Indian child custody proceeding by temporarily
leaving

the

reservation

and

attempting

to

invoke

state

jurisdiction, yet can accomplish the same result by signing a
piece

of

non-Indians

paper
off

purporting
the

to

transfer

reservation.

Yet

parental

this

rights

is precisely

to
the

effect of the District Court's ruling.
Two states have specifically addressed this issue under the
ICWA (both encompassing portions of the Navajo reservation) and
both have decided the issue exactly opposite to the ruling of the
District Court in the present case.

In Matter of Appeal in Pima

County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981),
cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007

(1982), the mother

(a minor) gave

birth off-reservation, relinquished the child off-reservation for
the purpose of adoption, and the child lived off-reservation with
the prospective adoptive parents pursuant to a temporary custody
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order.

IdL at 191.

Yet the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that

none of these actions were sufficient to divest the tribe of its
exclusive jurisdiction since the child was still domiciled on the
reservation.

^d.

After noting that domicile of an infant born

out of wedlock remains that of the mother until a new one is
lawfully acquired

(Citing, Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312,

324 P.2d 773 (1958)), the court ruled that a consent to adoption
did not effect a legal change in the childfs domicile, Ld.

The

result of this ruling is that the mother could not confer jurisdiction on the state by her actions.
The same result occurred in Matter of the Adoption of a Baby
Child, 700 P.2d 198, No. 8190 (N.M. App., 1985).

In that case

the Indian mother, a resident of Laguna Pueblo in New Mexico,
consented to the adoption of her child by non-Indian adoptive
parents before the state court.
mother's

actions

shifted

the

The trial court ruled that the
domicile

of

the

child

to

the

adoptive parents, giving the state court jurisdiction over the
adoption proceeding.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that

"jurisdiction over the proceedings was exclusive in the tribal
court. . ."
takes

Id. at 200.

the domicile

of

After noting that an illegitimate child
its mother, the

court

ruled

that the

actions of the mother did not confer jurisdiction on the state
court.

Id. at 201.
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These decisions illustrate the error of the District Court's
ruling in the present case.

The principle that an individual may

net confer jurisdiction on a court by consent is identical to the
principle discussed in the previous section that domicile cannot
be changed except by judicial decree.
jurisdiction

before

it

can

The court must first have

entertain

a

consent

to

transfer

parental rights; to hold that the consent or transfer of physical
custody

gives

the

state court

jurisdiction

is an attempt to

bootstrap jurisdiction which does not otherwise exist.
The mother in this case, Cecelia Saunders, also could not
confer jurisdiction on the state court in this proceeding because
she did not have the legal authority under tribal custom to do
so.

The District Court's failure to recognize the social rela-

tions of Navajo people is an express violation of the ICWA, 25
U.S.C. §1901(5); 25 U.S.C. §1903(6).
The Navajo common law of adoption is set forth at Opinion of
the Solicitor to the Courts of the Navajo Nation, Nc. 83-10
(1983)

(Attached

as Addendum

Exhibit

"B", pp. A-2-7).

This

Opinion is entitled to full faith and credit by the State of Utah
as a public record of the Navajo tribe.
Navajo

custom

relationships

does
created

not
by

recognize
Anglo-European

25 U.S.C. §1911 (d).

the

artificial

law

wherein

legal

adoption

results in the termination of the legal rights of the natural
parents

and

the replacement of those rights
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in the adoptive

parents.
family

Addendum pp. A-2 f 3.

members

to

support

Instead, there is an obligation in
and

assist

children

which

is not

concerned with the termination of parental rights or the creation
of a "legalistic" parent-child relationship.
Similarly, Navajo custom

does not agree with

the Anglo-

European concept that the duties of child-rearing exist only in
the nuclear family, and that parents of a child can terminate the
legal rights of extended family members, such as grandparents, to
visit with or obtain custody of a child.

Under Navajo custom

there is an "expectation that children are to be taken care of,
and that obligation is not simply one of the child's parents."
Addendum, p. A-4.

Navajo

custom

"is not concerned

with

the

termination of parental rights or creating a legalistic parent
and child relationship because these concepts are irrelevant in a
system which has obligations to children that extend beyond the
parents."

Addendum,

p.

A-6

(emphasis

added).

Under

Navajo

custom, a parent can no more consent to the termination of the
rights of extended family members than she could consent to the
termination of the parental rights of the father.
The

District

Court

in

the

recognize this concept, however.

present

case

has

refused

to

It ruled that the consent of

the mother freed the child for adoption by the Carters.

The

maternal grandmother, the custodian of Jeremiah at the time he
was removed, did not consent to his removal
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127) and Cecelia's consent could not affect her legal right to
custody of-Jeremiah under tribal custom.

25 U.S.C. §1903 (b).

Cecelia could also not waive the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Navajo

tribe

to determine

the grandmother's

custodial

rights

pursuant to tribal law and custom, and therefore her consent
could not waive the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction.

The lack of

understanding of the District Court in this area emphasizes the
reasoning that custodial relationships under tribal custom are
properly the exclusive province of the tribal court.
POINT III, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN
IT FOUND THAT REMEDIAL AND REHABILITATIVE
SERVICES HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO THE MOTHER
AND PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL.
The ICWA requires that "[a]ny party seeking to effect a
...termination of parental rights to an Indian child under State
law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts
have proved unsuccessful."

25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).

In its order of

January 28, 1985, the District Court found that "the burden of
rehabilitation

and

Addendum, p. A-23.

working

with

the

family

has

been

met."

This finding was in error because the court

did not apply the proper standard in determining whether such
services had been provided.
The legislative history of the ICWA makes clear that remedial services must be designed to help the parents or Indian
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custodians.

The BIA Guidelines

state that it must be demon-

strated tfiaft "efforts have been made to alleviate the need to
remove the Indian child from his or her parents or Indian custodians."

BIA

(Emphasis

Guidelines, , 44 Fed. Reg. 67584,

added).

The

congressional

history

67592

(§ D.2)

emphasizes

that

actual efforts must be made to help the parents of an Indian
child before termination can occur.

See House Feport, supra, at

22.
Two ICWA cases have addressed the issue of remedial services.

In Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635

P.2d at 193, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that section
1912(d)

required

relationship"

an

(emphasis

"attempt

to

added).

preserve

the

See, Matter

parent-child

of Charles, 688

P.2d. 1354 (Or. App. 1984), appeal pending, the Oregon Court of
Appeals.

The most disturbing

findings of the District Court

appear at page 3 of the court's opinion.
hypothetical

testimony

of

two

Reference is made to

representatives

of

the

Navajo

Division of Social Welfare that have nothing to do with removal
and rehabilitative efforts.
Shirley's

general

background

concept in Navajo culture.

First, reference is made to Ella
testimony

on

the

"shared

care"

The court dismissed this testimony by

concluding that all the relatives were unsuitable to care for
Jeremiah even though the most recent evidence was five years old.
In addition, this testimony had nothing to do with the care which
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could be given by the mother.

Second, the Court quoted testimony

by Ella SfTTrley in response to a hypothetical question that if
Jeremiah could not be placed with the extended family, would she
have thought about allowing adoption outside the Navajo tribe.
Transcript I, p. 109.

Ms. Shirley stated that she would place

Jeremiah with another Navajo family.
The District Court found that "[t]he social worker admits
based upon those facts rehabilitation with the natural family
would have been discontinued and the child would have been placed
with another Navajo family."
Court based
Bernally,
efforts.

is

upon

The conclusion made by the District

the testimony of the social worker, Lauren

improper

and

has

nothing

to

do

with

remedial

Ms. Bernally was testifying on the critical interest

the Navajo tribe has in its children, and stated only that even
if in the extended family the natural mother could not care for
Jeremiah, the interest of the tribe in retaining him in Navajo
culture is such that they would have placed him in another Navajo
home.

Ms. Bernally1s testimony had nothing to do with actual

efforts made to help the mother retain Jeremiah.

Indeed, Ms.

Bernally testified that no remedial or rehabilitative services
were necessary because the mother had improved her situation on
her own.

Transcript I, p. 124.

As stated before, the testimony

of Dr. Samuel Roll, expert witness for the Navajo tribe, showed
that Cecelia and Arthur Saunders were fit parents and that they
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had

no

conditions

which

would

be

detrimental

to

Jeremiah.

Transcriptr-fl, pp. 237-39.
Finally, the District Court found that the tribe's social
worker

stated

that

the

mother

"vascilates

Fsic]

continually

between wanting the child back and not wanting the child".

The

apparent implication of this finding is that the mother could not
be worked with, but the Court presents no evidence or authority
to prove that such vacillation was bad or improper.
testimony

was

parents,

that

unanimous, even
such

vacillation

from
is

experts
a

for

common

In fact, the
the

adoptive

occurrence

in a

drawn-out adoption case and has nothing to do with the actual
desire of the mother for custody of her child.

Transcript I, p.

126 (Lauren Bernally); Transcript II, pp. 197-198.
Transcript II, pp. 239-240

(Dr. Roll).

(Dr. Howell);

The Court's finding on

this point is, therefore, improper since it is either based on
the personal opinion of the District Court judge or on authority
to which the parties had no access, rather than from evidence
presented to the court.

As such, the finding is arbitrary and

capricious and should be overturned.
The remedial services section of the ICWA requires that the
party seeking to effect a termination of parental rights must
satisfy the court that they have made active efforts to help the
family.

25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).

private parties.

This applies to both public and

House Feport, supra, at 22.
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The testimony is

undisputed that the adoptive parents in this case have had no
contact atr-all with the natural mother, and that they made no
attempts to see whether the mother could be assisted in resolving
her personal difficulties

rather

than taking her child away.

Transcript I, p. 43 (Cecelia Saunders), and p. 79 (Dan Carter).
Basing the "failure of remedial and rehabilitative efforts" on
the

purported

inadequacy

of

relatives

and

the

alleged

prior

neglect of the mother, without any showing of the present need
for

services

by

the

mother

or

that

specific

services

were

actually provided to the mother and failed, is violative of the
constitutional right to raise a family.
CHILDREN

IN THE COURTS 255

See, M. Hardin, FOSTER

(American Bar Ass'n. Nat'l. Legal

Resources Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, 1983) (diligent efforts to provide supportive services).

The District Court

committed error in finding that the burden of working with the
family under the ICWA had been met.
Court must be reversed.

The decision of the District

No remedial or rehabilitative services

were ever provided to the mother, and the burden of proof in 25
U.S.C. § 1912(d) has not been met.

POINT IV, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED
ERROR BY DENYING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO
THE ORDER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COURT,
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At the conclusion of the April 7, 1983 hearing, the adoptive
parents

stated

that

they

could

be

termination hearing in 30 to 45 days.

ready

for

the

subsequent

Transcript I, p. 171.

The

Court also evidenced its intent at that point to move the proceeding along.

Id. at 171-172.

Sixteen months later no steps

had been taken by petitioners to fulfill their burden of showing
that the parental rights of the natural mother should be terminated, while the Indian child's emotional attachment to his
non-Indian custodians was increasing.

At this point the Navajo

tribe decided to take action to invalidate the District Court's
jurisdictional ruling rather than wait an indefinite period of
time for the state proceeding to be completed.
action

was

filed

in

the

Navajo

District, on August 8, 1984.

District

A tribal court

Court, Window

Rock

In response to the tribal court

proceeding, the adoptive parents requested

an immediate trial

setting on the termination hearing in state court, and did not
appear in the tribal proceeding despite being personally served.
The tribal court
holding

that

the

issued

Navajo

a decision

tribe

had

on October 12, 1984,

exclusive

jurisdiction

to

decide the custody of Jeremiah Halloway and invalidating the Utah
District Court proceeding pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare
Act.

Only five days later the tribe filed a Motion for Full

Faith and Credit for its order in the Utah District Court pursuant to the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).
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the District Court at the start of the October 22, 1984, hearing
as being untimely.

Transcript II, p. 3.

This holding is not

supported by case law and should be reversed.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties, and a court
cannot ignore lack of subject matter jurisdiction to reach the
merits
domain.

of

a

case

that

falls

outside

its

legally-prescribed

Utah Dept. of Bus. Reg., Etc. v» Public Service Comm,

supra, is such a case.

[A]n objection to the court's exercis'e of

jurisdiction may be made at any point during the proceedings."
Utah Dept. of Bus. Peg., Etc., supra, at 698 (emphasis added).
The Motion for Full Faith and Credit by the Navajo tribe was made
before the close of the District Court proceedings.
Case law is unanimous that subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any point in a proceeding.

Carlson v. Brown, 576

P.2d. 1387 (Ariz. App. 1978); Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 370 P.2d.
757 (Idaho 1962); In re Adoption of Marsolf, 434 P.2d. 1010 (Kan.
1967).

An objection to subject matter jurisdiction can be made

before

or

after

a

judgment

has

been

rendered.

Espinoza

v.

Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 624 P.2d 162 (Or. App), aff'd
635 P.2d. 638

(Or. 1980).

It can be raised even on appeal.

Unruh v. Truck Inc. Exchange, 498 P.2d 1063 (Calif. 1972).

No

estoppel exists to asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

-26-
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Application of Puget Sound Pilots Assn., 385 P.2d.

711 (Wash.

1963) .
The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children is specific
Utah statutory authority which contradicts the District Court's
ruling on the Full Faith and Credit Motion.
§ 55-86-1.

UTAH CODE ANN.

The Utah version of the ICPC includes Indian tribes

within its definition of "Sending agency."

Article II (2). The

jurisdiction section of the ICPC states that:
[T]he sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all
matters in relation to the custody... and
disposition of the child which it would have had
if the child had remained in the sending agency's
state, until the child is adopted... Such
jurisdiction shall also include the power to
effect or cause the return of the child or its
transfer to another location...
Article V

(emphasis

added).

It cannot be disputed

that the

Navajo tribal court order was issued before Jeremiah was adopted,
and

that

the denial

of

full

faith

and

credit

on

timeliness

grounds is in direct contravention of Utah statutes, and should
be reversed.
POINT V, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE STATE OF UTAH HAD JURISDICTION UNDER THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OVER
THE ADOPTION PROCEEDING
Jeremiah Halloway was removed from the Navajo reservation
and placed in the home of the Carters in Utah on March 23, 1980.
No judical proceedings accompanied the placement until May 29,
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1980, when the mother was transported to Utah at the expense of
the Carters for execution of a consent to adoption before the
District Court.

An adoption petition was filed by the Carters

with the District Court on the same date.

Various agencies of

the Navajo tribe had been providing services to Jeremiah Halloway
and his family on a voluntary basis from his birth to the time he
was removed from the reservation.
In April, 1982, after negotiations to return Jeremiah to the
reservation on a voluntary basis had broken down, the Navajo
tribe filed a Motion to Dismiss the Utah adoption proceeding
based on a lack of jurisdiction.

The District Court issued a

ruling on the jurisdiction issue on July 14, 1982 holding:
[T]he domicile of the minor child to be that of
petitioners. This finding is based upon the fact
that the child's residence appears to have been
voluntarily and purposely removed
from the
natural mother, grandmother, and reservation to
the petitioners, in view of that fact and the
long period of time that the child has been with
the petitioners, this court finds that apparent
"good cause" exists for this court to take
jurisdiction. . . .
Addendum, p. A-10.
The jurisdiction issue was reargued at the April 7, 1983
hearing, at which time the District Court upheld its prior ruling
that domicile had shifted to Utah, based on the transfer of the
child

to

the

Carters

with

the

consent

of

some

members

of

Jeremiah's family and the intent to transfer all parental rights
to the Carters and abandon all parental rights in the child.
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The

court also ruled that the mother and family had abandoned the
child and—that the Carters stood in loco parentis to Jeremiah.
Addendum, pp. A-ll, 12.
they

held

that

the

These findings were incorrect insofar as

Navajo

Nation

had

been

divested

of

its

exclusive jurisdiction over Jeremiah Halloway.
Determination of the domicile of Jeremiah is critical in the
present case because it is the linch pin of the jurisdictional
controversy.

Indian tribes, in the absence of express federal

legislation, have always had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
their

internal

interference.

affairs

and

social

relations

free

from

state

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.

324, 76 L.Ed.2d 611, 619 (1983); Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 783, (1832).
matters,

This authority includes juvenile

Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 602, 604; 60 L.Ed.

1196; 35 S.Ct. 699

(1916); and domestic relations, Santa Clara

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 98 S.Ct.
1670 (1978).
Tribal

jurisdiction

has

a

territorial

component, too.

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commyn, 411 U.S. 164, 36 L.Ed.2d
129, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 93 S.Ct. 1267 (1973).

The standard for

determining whether a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction is whether
the proceeding can be "appropriately characterized as litigation
arising on an Indian reservation."
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supra, 424 U.S. at 389.

'Emphasis added).

If the standard is

met, "the-jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclusive." Id.
This rule applies whether or not all the parties are Indian.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S.Ct. 269
(1955)
U.S.

(Navajo reservation); Fisher District Court, supra, 424

at

386.

jurisdiction
tribal

If

there

is

a

dispute

over

whether

tribal

is exclusive, such dispute should be resolved in

court.

National

Tribe, 53 USLW 4641
will be minimized

Farmers

Union

Insurance

Co. v.

Crow

(June 3, 1985). "Procedural nightmare [s]"

if other courts stay their hand until the

tribal court "has had a full opportunity to determine its own
jurisdiction."

Id. See, also,

Fisher v. District Court, supra,

424 U.S. at 388 (conflicting adjudications with state courts).
For purposes of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over child
custody matters, courts have equated "arising on a reservation"
with

the

domicile

of

the

Indian

child.

Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F.Supp.

Wisconsin

719, 731

Band

of

(D.W.D. Mich.,

1973); Matter of Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334, 1341 (Wash.
1976); Wakefield v. Little, Light, 347 A.2d 228, 238

(Md. App.

1975); In re Matter of Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (Or. App. 1975).
Congress specifically adopted the holdings of these cases when it
confirmed

exclusive

Report, supra, at 21.

tribal

jurisdiction

in

the

ICWA.

House

The exclusive jurisdiction section of the

ICWA is set forth in 25 USC §1911 (a).
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The

ICWA

does

not

contain

a

definition

of

the

term

"domicile.""^ The legislative history of the Act provides little
illumination

except

for

the

fact

that

Congress

intended

to

confirm the case lav/ of the Wisconsin Potowatonies, Wakefield v.
Little Light, Ruehl and Greybull decisions cited above, and these
cases

interpreted

minor.

the meaning

of domicile when

applied

to a

There are well settled canons of statutory construction,

however, which control the interpretation of terms in federal
statues.

See, Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S.

103, 34 L.Ed. 2d 845, 103 S.Ct. 986 (1983).
A substantial body of federal common law has been developed
which
The

interprets the meaning of domicile
federal

"citizenship11

diversity

statute,

to determine

28

whether

in federal statutes.

U.S.C.

diversity

courts have equated citizenship with domicile.
235 U.S. 561, 59 L.Ed.

360, 35 S.Ct.

164

§1332 (a),

uses

exists, and

all

Gilbert v. David,
(1915);

Stifel v.

Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir., 1973); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.
2d 1176 (7th Cir., 1980).

No definition of citizenship appears

in the federal diversity statute, and the courts have ruled that
determination of the term is controlled by federal common law
rather than the law of any state.

Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries,

704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983); Sadat v. Mertes, supra, at
1180; Stifel v. Hopkins, supra, at 1120.
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One federal case specifically addressed the domicile of a
minor chiW^-for purposes of the federal diversity statue, and the
holding of the case has been adopted by all of the diversity
cases cited above.

In Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873 (4th Cir.

1968), the court adopted the Restatement of the Laws of Conflicts
(1934 ed., §38, domicile of a minor) as the federal common law
for the domicile of a minor, Id. at 874, because the Restatement
was consistent with the policies behind creation of the federal
diversity statute.

Id. at 875.

below, the Restatement
Conflict of Laws
purposes

of

the

As will be shown immediately

(now codified at Restatement (Second) of

(1971 ed. , §22) is also consistent with the
ICWA

of

keeping

Indian

children

with

their

families, deferring to tribal judgment on child custody matters,
and placing Indian children in Indian homes.

25 U.S.C. §1902;

BIA Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 6785-86
Such

a

result

is

consistent

with

canons

(§ A., Policy).
of

construction

specifically developed by the U. S. Supreme Court to interpret
federal statutes affecting Indians, namely that statutes passed
for the benefit of Indians must be liberally construed in their
favor, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 48 L.Ed.2d 710,
96 S.Ct. 2102

(1976), and ambiguous language in such statutes

must be resolved in favor of the Indians.

McClanahan v. Arizona

State Tax Commission, supra, 411 U.S. at 174.
a

statement

of existing

The Restatement is

laws, and, as the Bureau of
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Indian

Affairs noted at the time the ICWA was passed, there was no
indicationr-that

"these

state

law

definitions

undermine in any way the purposes of the Act."

tendfed]

to

BIA Guidelines,

supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 6785 (Introduction).
We now turn to the Restatement' s summary of the law of the
domicile

of a minor.

All

references

(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).

are

to the

Restatement

The critical issue in the

present case is the methods by which the domicile of a minor can
be

changed,

and

whether

such

a

change

occurred

here.

To

characterize the laws in advance, change in the domicile of a
minor where

the

parent

does

not

change

his

or her

domicile

requires a court order, with one exception which does not apply
in this case.
Every person acquires a domicile of origin at birth, and
this

domicile

continues

until

a

new

domicile

is

acquired.

Restatement, §14(1); S14, comment a. "At birth an illegitimate
child

takes the domicile his mother has at the

domicile of origin (see §14)."

time as his

Restatement, §22, comment c.

The

general rule is that the domicile of a minor child remains that
of the mother.

Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P. 2d

773, 774 (1958); Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action
No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187, (Ariz. App. 1981), cert, denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982); Matter of Adoption of Baby Child, 700 P.2d 198
(N.M. App. 1985) .
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Comment c to section 22 of the Restatement states that an
illegitimate child takes the domicile of the mother whether he
lives with the mother or not, except as stated in Comments e-i.
It

is these comments which must be

scrutinized

to determine

whether a change of domicile occurred in the present case.

The

rule stated in each relevant comment will be contrasted with the
actual ruling of the District Court in the present case.
Comment e addresses the domicile of an abandoned child and
states that ". . . a child abandoned by both parents retains the
domicile possessed by the parent who last abandoned him at the
time of abandonment

. . ."

Abandonment is defined to include

when the parent gives the custody of the child to another with
the

intention

obligations.

of

relinquishing

his

parental

rights

and

Since the natural mother's domicile in the present

case has always been on the Navajo reservation, under this rule
Jeremiah's domicile would also remain there even when he was
abandoned.
1981).

K.N, v. Cades, 432 A.2d 1010, 1014

(Pa. Super. Ct.

Yet the District Court predicated its ruling on domicile

on the abandonment by the mother and transfer of parental rights
to the Carters.

Addendum, p. A-10; Addendum, p. A-12.

Comment g addresses the domicile of an adopted child, and
states that an adopted child takes the domicile of the adoptive
parent "at the moment of adoption."

-34-
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can be taken from this statement is that the domicile of a child
who is being considered for adoption does not change before the
decree of adoption is granted.

This is especially true since

adoption statutes are in derogation of the common law and must,
therefore, be strictly and narrowly construed

in favor of the

rights of natural parents.

2 Am. Jur. 2d 865, 866 (Adoption, §§

6,7).

in accord with

This

rule

is also

the domicile of an

abandoned child discussed above in Comment e, where abandonment
includes

transfer

parental rights.

of

custody

with

the

intent

to

Domicile of the child remains with the parent

until a judicial decree of adoption is completed.
Cades , supra, at 432.
bootstrapped

its

relinquish

See, K.N, v.

In the present case the District Court

jurisdiction,

holding

that

the

domicile

of

Jeremiah shifted informally so as to give the court jurisdiction
over the adoption proceeding itself.
correct,

the

domicile

of

If the rule of Comment g is

Jeremiah

remained

on

the

Navajo

reservation, giving the Tribal Court exclusive jurisdiction over
the adoption proceeding.
Comment h addresses
child's domicile.

the power of a guardian to shift a

The Carters have argued at various times in

this proceeding that they became the guardians of Jeremiah when
they obtained his physical custody, and that domicile of the ward
is that of the guardian.

See, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion

to Dismiss, filed July 6, 1982, p. 2.

Yet it is well settled
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that

a person

can become

a guardian

of

a minor

child

only

"through judicial decree following compliance with the statuatory
procedures."
(Mont.

Matter of Adoption of T.M.M.. 608 P.2d

1980).

Restatement

Once

again, a

recognizes

this

court

order

principle

is

by

130, 133

required.

stating

that

The
the

authority of a guardian must be ascertained from "the original
decree of appointment or in some subsequent order".
h.

§22, Comment

In any event, a guardian does not normally have the power to

shift

the

domicile

of

a minor.

Two

of

the

cases

cited

by

Congress as the basis for the exclusive jurisdiction section,
Wakefield v. Little Light, supra, at 238, and Matter of Adoption
of

Buehl,

555

P. 2d

at

1340-42, both

rejected

arguments

of

non-Indian guardians of Indian children that the domicile of the
children had
cited

shifted off reservation with

the federal policy of protecting

essential

tribal

relations

as

one

them.

Both courts

tribal authority over

reason

not

to

imply

a

guardian's authority to shift the domicile of the ward.
The last comment of Section 22, Comment i, is the exception
to the general rule that shifting the domicile of a minor child
requires a judicial decree.

Comment i addresses the doctrine of

in loco parentis or the "natural guardian" theory.

Where both

parents of a child are dead or have abandoned a child and no
court has appointed a guardian for the child, "the child should

-36-
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acquire a domicile at the home of a grandparent or other person
who stands'"in loco parentis to him and with whom he lives."
The in loco parentis doctrine is limited to blood relatives,
and no case has ever held that unrelated strangers can acquire
such status so as to change the domicile of a child.

In fact,

the in loco parentis doctrine has traditionally been confined to
grandparents, and has only recently been "liberalized" to include
other close relatives

such as aunts and uncles.

See, Annot:

Domicile of infant on death of both parents; doctrine of natural
guardianship, 32 A.L.R.2d

863, 871.

In the present case the

District Court ruled that the domicile of Jeremiah shifted to the
Carters

because

the

Addendum, p. A-12.

Carters

stood

in

loco

parentis

to

him.

The Carters, however, are not related by

blood to Jeremiah and all of the cases cited in their briefs,
such as Montoya v. Collier 512 P.2d 684 (N.M. 1973), involved
blood relatives.

The District Court's reliance on the in loco

parentis theory to hold that the domicile of Jeremiah shifted
from the Navajo reservation to Utah without a court order is,
therefore, in error.
The time for determining the domicile of Jeremiah was when
he first appeared before the District Court in 1980.
States Supreme Court has ruled

The United

from the earliest days of the

Republic that jurisdiction depends on the status of the parties
at the commencement of a suit, and no subsequent change can give
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or take it away.
L.Ed.

Connolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556, 7

518-- (1829).

determination

of

diversity cases.

This

rule

has

been

applied

domicile

under

the

federal

to

common

Sadat v. Mertes, supra, 615 F.2d

law

cited

by

Congress

as

the basis

for

the

One of

exclusive

jurisdiction section of the ICWA also adopted this rule.
Report, supra, at 21.

in

at 1180;

Leavitt v. Scott, 338 F.2d 749 (10th Cir., 1964) (Utah).
the cases

the

House

In Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies, supra,

the court addressed the question of when jurisdiction should be
determined and concluded "that the only rational approach is to
determine the domicile of the children at the time their physical
custody was gained by the probate court."
The

District

Court

based

its

holding

393 F.Supp at 731.

that

the

domicile

of

Jeremiah had shifted to Utah in the present case on the length of
time

he

had

initiated.

resided

in

the

Addendum, p. A-10.

state

since

the

proceeding

was

This holding is incorrect.

The Utah Supreme Court decision in Application of Morse,
supra, supports the principles discussed above.

In that case, a

mother domiciled in Utah consented to the adoption of her child,
and the prospective adoptive parents removed the child from Utah.
The mother then revoked her consent and asked for the child back.
The adoptive parents argued that Utah was without jurisdiction
because the child was now domiciled in Idaho.

The Utah Supreme

Court rejected this argument and held that the child remained
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domiciled

in

Utah,

despite
and

the

"abandoned"*- the

child

parental rights.

324 P.2d at 775.

fact

intended

to

that

the

transfer

mother
all

of

had
her

The Court also held that the

mother's consent violated Utah law and was, therefore, void and
had no legal effect.

This holding is analogous to the Navajo

Nation's argument in the present case that the natural mother's
consent

violated

the

ICWA

and

was,

therefore,

void

and

ineffective as a legal attempt to abandon her parental rights and
shift jurisdiction over Jeremiah to Utah.
All of the ICWA cases that have addressed the domicile and
exclusive

jurisdiction

issues

have

followed

the

principles

discussed above and have been decided opposite to the holding of
the District Court in the present case.

Matter of Guardianship

of D.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980); Matter of
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, supra
Matter of Adoption of Baby Child, supra (N.M.).

(Ariz);

The Pima County

and Baby Child cases are particularly important in the context of
the present appeal because they involve states where portions of
the Navajo reservation are located in addition to Utah.
holding of the District Court on jurisdiction

If the

is upheld, the

Navajo Nation will be confronted with conflicting interpretations
of the ICWA on different parts of it's reservation, a result
clearly at variance with the intent of the ICWA to establish
uniform federal law involving Indian children.
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The Pima County case is particularly illustrative because
the natural mother in that case did not live on the reservation
(in Montana), the child was born off-reservation in Nevada and
placed in an adoptive home in Arizona.

The Arizona Court of

Appeals first held that the domicile of the infant followed that
of the mother.

Because the mother was also a minor, however, the

Court ruled in addition that the domicile of the mother was that
of her parents, on the reservation in Montana.

Despite the fact

that the mother had signed a consent to adoption, the adoptive
parents had custody of the child pursuant to a temporary custody
order, and the child had been out of the mother's custody for
seven

months,

the

remained with

the

caused

a

Court

of

Appeals

concluded

natural mother because

"legal" change of domicile, 635

that

domicile

no court order had
P.2d

at

191.

The

decisions of the New Mexico and Arizona Courts of Appeal should
be followed by the Utah Supreme Court in the present case.
One unintended effect of the District Court's jurisdictional
ruling must be raised.

The court ruled that the parental rights

of the mother could be transferred by her consent to adoption.
Addendum, p. A-12.

This holding is in violation of the principle

that parental rights and responsibilites cannot be discarded at
will by parents; they disappear only at death or at the moment of
adoption

when

such

responsibilities

transfer

parent.

59 Am.Jur. 2d 90-107 (Parent and Child, §§8-24, rights
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to the

adoptive

of parents) •

Utah has followed this principle in its case law,

See, Gulley- v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah, 1977) (duty to
support cannot be relinquished by purporting to transfer duty by
contract),

and

by

statute,

Utah

Code

Annotated

§§78-45-4.2,

78-42-2(5) (natural or adoptive parent has duty to support).
The District Court's ruling, therefore, sets up a privileged
class in violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution.

While the Carters acquired the benefit of a change

of domicile for purposes of adopting Jeremiah, the natural mother
was still responsible under Utah statute to support her child
under the holding of Gulley.

Either all responsibilities are

transferred when the consent to adoption is signed and the Utah
support statutes must fail, or all responsibilities transfer when
a court order issues granting the adoption, in which case the
District Court's jurisdictional ruling was incorrect.
over

domicile

and

the

duty

to

support

are

both

Control

rights

and

responsibilities of parents; they cannot be split to deny the
parent the benefits of parenthood while still saddling her with
the burdens of such relationship.
Finally, the State of Utah was without jurisdiction over
Jeremiah

because

the

Navajo

Nation

was

already

exerting

jurisdiction on a voluntary basis at the time he was removed from
the reservation.

It is undisputed that several Navajo agencies

were providing assistance to Jeremiah and his family from 1977
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until he was removed.

Transcript I, pp. 62, 119.

The aunt who

removed Jeremiah from the Navajo tribe, Polly Dick, testified
that she concealed Jeremiah's removal because she disagreed with
the tribefs plans for him.

Transcript

I, p. 63.

Polly had

previously removed other Navajo children from the reservation to
Utah in violation of Navajo law.

Transcript I, p. 113.

The ICWA

requires state courts to decline jurisdiction where an Indian
child has been removed and to return the child to the parent.
U.S.C. §1920.

25

The District Court erred in not following this

requirement.
POINT VI, THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF CECELIA
SAUNDERS WITHOUT A FINDING OF UNFITNESS
WAS IN ERROR.
In its order of January 28,1985, the District Court found
"that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that to
return Jeremiah to his Indian custodians would result in serious
emotional

or

Therefore, no
Cecelia
based

physical

on

him."

Addendum,

en unfitness

on

p. A-24.

the part of

The District Court's termination order was
the

condition

emotional damage he would
Carters.

to

finding was made

Saunders.
solely

damage

of

Jeremiah

Halloway

suffer if he was removed

and

the

from the

3jd., p. A-16.

The finding of the District Court confused the two separate
stages of a termination proceeding:
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the parents must be found unfit, and the dispositional
where

the~~^best

interests

of

the

independent of parental interest.

child

can

1364, 1368-69

considered

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 611, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982).
re J.P., 648 P.2d

be

stage

(Utah 1982).

See, also, In
By holding only

that the best interests of Jeremiah required termination because
he

was

so

bonded

to

present

custodians

the

District

Court

violated the requirements of the United States Constitution, and
the Indian Child Welfare Act.
The right of parents to sustain a relationship with their
children is protected by the Constitution.

In re J.P., 648 P.2d

1364, 1372-74, 1377 (Utah 1982).
"The rights of adoptive parents are not, however, enveloped
in the same degree of due process protection which attaches to
the divestiture of parental custody."
M, 135 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873 (Cal.

Guardianship of Baby Boy

App. 1977).

It is well settled

that termination of parental rights would offend the Due Process
Clause if the breakup of a family is forced without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to
be in the children's best interest.

Santosky v. Kramer, supra,

71 L.Ed.2d at 611; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978);
Smith v.. Organization of Foster Familes, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63
(1977); In re J.P., supra, 648 P.2d at 1374, 1377.

The natural

mother in the present case was never informed of the specific
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conditions that led to her "unfitness" so that she could have a
chance to -take appropriate remedial action.
the mother is a denial of due process.

Failure to so inform

State v. Lance, 23 Utah

2d 407, 464 P.2d 395, 399 (1970).
The Utah Supreme Court has established a clear standard that
a court may not terminate the rights of a parent solely in the
best interests of the child.

In re J.P. , supra, at 1368, 1374.

The best

is applicable

interests

standard

only

to a custody

dispute between parents, Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119, 125
(Utah, 1978); for termination the parents must be found unfit.
J.P., supra, at 1374.
Several Utah decisions have addressed the holding of the
District Court in the present case that parental rights can be
terminated

solely

on

the

child's

attachment

to

his

present

caretakers rather than through any fault of the parents, and have
rejected such reasoning.
578

P.2d

831

(Utah

In State, In Interest of E. v. J.T.,

1978),

the

juvenile

court

based

its

termination of parental rights order in part on the finding that
the children regarded their foster parents as their psychological
parents and had had no contact with the mother for over two and
one-half years."

Id. at 834.

The Supreme Court rejected this

reasoning, Id. at 836, and reversed the termination order.
also, Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d

119

See,

(Utah 1978); and

Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 433 A.2d 1363, 1380-82 (Pa.
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Super. Ct. 1981) (extensive discussion of the distinction between
medical and^-legal models).
The District Court made no finding of unfitness on the part
of the mother.

Indeed, the testimony was undisputed that Cecelia

Saunders and her husband, Arthur, were fit parents.

Transcript

II, pp. 237-239; Letter from Dr. Mueller, Addendum, p. A-l.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that termination
of parental rights must be based on present conduct, and all of
the evidence
considered

of parental

by

the

conduct

District

offered

Court,

abandonment, was several years old.

by

the Carters

including

the

issue

and
of

In Interest of Winger, 558

P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court, after noting that
Oregon's termination statute is "identical" to Utah's, Id. at
1313, adopted the holding of the Oregon Court of Appeals in State
v. Blum, 463 P.2d 367, 371 (Or.App. 1970), that the evidence must
prove "that the parent is presently unable to supply physical and
emotional

care

for

(emphasis added).
675

P.2d

1117,

the

child

.

.

."

558

P. 2d

at 1313-14.

See, State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. v. Chapin
1118

(Or.App.

1984).

This

requirement

of

"present" conduct has been followed in all other Utah termination
cases.

In re J.P., supra, 648 P.2d at 1377 (parent must be shown

to be "unfit, abandoning, or substantially neglectful"); Interest
of Walter B., supra, 577 P.2d at 124 (quoting State v. Lance, 464
P.2d

395

(Utah

1970),

on

"the

alleged

inadequacies
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of

the

environment she was providing"); In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855,
857 (Utah "1981) (prospect of beneficial parenting).

See, also,

In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 473 A.2d 1021, 1027 (Pa." Super.
1984).
In State, In Interest of E. v. J.T., supra, the mother also
placed

her

children

from

a

former

marriage

voluntarily

in

substitute care because of problems with her present husband.
5 78 P. 2d

at

terminating

832.

the

The Utah

parental

Supreme Court

rights

of

the

reversed

mother

an order

despite

the

position of the state that the mother had taken no action to
solve her problems, Id. at 835, finding the mother was attempting
to address the problems which had led to the initial placement.
Id.

In the present case, the mother has also taken care of the

problems

that

led

to the initial placement, and as the Utah

Supreme Court noted in State v. Lance, supra, there is not " . . .
a scintilla of evidence that the home itself cannot or will not
correct the evils which exist." 464 P. 2d at 399.
incidents

which

are

the

basis

of

the

trial

Where the

court's

opinion

occurred several years before the hearing and no evidence was
presented

to

show

that

the

adversely affect the child,

mother's
" . . .

present

conduct

past misconduct

controlling where a parent is presently fit."

would
is not

In re Adoption of

Michael J.C., supra, 473 A.2d at 1C27.
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I

The District Court also found abandonment because the mother
knew where"^the Carters lived, but made no attempt to contact
them.

Addendum, p. A-24.

However, the Carters testified that

they were advised to prohibit visitation

(Transcript I, p. 80)

and the Carters1 attorney told the mother that she could not
contact the child

(Transcript I, p. 44).

Indian people have a

well established trait of "non-interference" in the affairs of
others, particularly where confronted with non-Indian authority
figures.

See,

e.g.

J.

Good

Tracks,

non-interference", 18 Social Work 30 (1973).

"Native

American

Once she was told

that she could not contact her child, she believed she had no
option

and her

failure to visit does not reflect

a lack of

desire, but rather a lack of understanding.
The ICWA adopted the constitutional "fitness" standard but
imposed an additional level of proof which can "rarely" be met.
Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at 768-69.

The ICWA requires

a ". . . determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that
the continued custody of the child by the parent. . . is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."
25 U.S.C. §1912(f).
parent

which

will

The Act requires conduct on the part of the
be

finding of unfitness.

seriously

detrimental

to

the

child, a

BIA Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593

(§§D.3(c); D.4). In fact, termination cannot be ordered "simply
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based on a determination on that the parents or custodians are
'unfit parents1.

It must be shown that it is dangerous for the

child

with

to

remain

his

or

her

present

Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593

custodians."

(§D.3. Commentary).

BIA
Every

reported ICWA case addressing termination of parental rights has
required a finding that the parent's conduct toward the child
would be so detrimental as to cause the child serious emotional
or physical harm. See, e.g., Matter of Appeal in Pima County
Juvenile Action No. S-903, supra, 635 P.2d at 193; In re Fisher,
643 P.2d 887

(Wash. App. 1982), In the Matter of J.L.H., 316

N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1982).
The Carters successfully argued to the District Court that
termination

of parental

rights was

justified

under

the

ICWA

because continued custody of Jeremiah by Ceclia would result in
emotional damage to him, not through any conduct on the part of
the mother, but only because her actions in asserting parental
rights would cause him damage because he would suffer harm by
being removed from the custody of the Carters.

This is the same

best interests test rejected by both the U.S. and Utah Supreme
Courts.

It

constitutional

is

well

structures

settled
in

its

that

Congress

dealings

with

must

follow

Indians.

F.

Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 217-220 (1982 ed.), and so
Congress could not possibly have imposed a standard on Indians
which has been found to be unconstitutional.

It also makes no
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sense to permit an easier "best interests" or "condition of the
child" termination test under the ICWA when the stated purpose of
the ICWA was to make termination more difficult.

See, 25 U.S.C.

§1921.
The

District

Court

ruled

in

essence

that

the

Navajo

reservation was an improper place for Jeremiah to grow upf and
that his Navajo environment would cause him severe emotional or
physical damage.

The Utah Supreme Court rejected such a standard

In re J.P., supra, 648 P.2d at 1376 where it held that cultural
diversity
also

is entitled

specifically

conditions.

to constitutional protection.

prohibits

termination

based

on

The ICWA
community

BIA Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67592-93

(SD.3. (c)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decree of adoption issued by
the District Court in the present proceeding should be declared
void,

and

the

custody

of

Jeremiah

Halloway

natural mother, Cecelia Saunders.
Submitted this

^~^

day of July, 1985.

7f\Ui^~Mary' Ellen Sloan
Craig Dorsay
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OPINION OF THE SOLICITOR TO THE
COURTS OF THE NAVAJO NATION
No. 83-10
QUESTION:

What is the Navajo Com.non Law of adoption?
•

This opinion is prepared for the Honorable William Leupp, former
judge of the Courts of the Navajo Nation, at the instruction of Chief Justice
Nelson J. McCsbe.
There are some very important distinctions and differences in approaching
the Navajo Common Law of adoption because it is quite different from the AngloEuropean law of adoption.
First of all, Anglo-European adoption focuses upon artificial legal
relationships:
"Adoption is the legal process by"which a child
acquires parents other than his natural parents and
parents acquire a child other than a natural child.
As a result of the adoption decree the legal rights
and obligations which formerly existed between the
child and his natural parents come to a"n end, and
are replaced by similar rights and obligations with
respect to his new adoptive parents." Clark, The Law
of Domestic Relations in the United States, Sec. 18.1,
p. 602 (1968).
In other words, the law makes a substitution of parents for a child and terminates
the parent and child bond with the natural parents (at least legally-speaking).
;

The adoption process requires the termination of the legal bond with natural

parents because of the idea that there can only be one parent and child relu*#onftr}?.

ship at any one time. JW.
Another important point about Anglo-European adoption law is that it is

a law which is created only by statute, and it did not come to the United States
courts through the English Common (or customary) Law. Ic|. at p. 603. As a result,"
the current American law of adaption is recent and a product of modern American
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attitudes.

There has alno been a history of hostility toward the law of

f
v

adoption in American courts, possibly due to the fact thatitwas not created
over a long period of time by the courts to fit the needs of those who have
come before them. I_d.
The American law of adoption thinks in terms of duties.

Natural

parents have duties toward their children, and when those duties are breached,
then the law will take the children away from the natural parents and "give"
them to other parents. Navajo concepts are different, and the following
description has been made of Navajo legal attitudes toward family relationships:
"Navajo believe that each person has the right to speak
for oneself and to act as one pleases. The mutual rights and
duties of kinsmen normally discussed under the concept of jural
relations are best described as mutual expectations, rather.than
obligations. This distinction is a matter of emphasis and decree,
but it is yery real and worth noting. Desirable actions on the
part of others are hoped for and even expected, but they are not
required or demanded. Coercion is always deplored." Witherspobn,
Navajo Kinship and Marriage, pp. 94-95 (1975).
/'
Therefore the Navajo view of the relation of children to parents is not one of a
simple parent and child relationship, but an entire pattern of expectations and
desirable actions surrounding children.
The central concept of child rearing in Navajo society should be grasped
before there is any discussion of the Navajo Common Law of adoption. One description of that concept is:
.

.

.

.

; .

.-:
••

.'•'',,• :•.*:•',v
. ',
•

.

'.'••"."•••'••'"'i -* • : -"' ;
• • •
f-- .•
•;

..:-h-:U "•<
^<l"~-».".fV-V r ' "

"The Navajo people identify themselves as 'Dine,1; which means
^
'The People.' The term v, simply an expression of native pride .or*;:^
a message that conveys m~:iy things which are central in native T " ; '.'"-?:
feelings. One of the m o t important societal values included in
this central native feeling is the attitude toward children. They
_.. are hiohly valued and wanted. The basis .for. .this Navajo life _ _ . _ _ „ _

T^t^
nal parents o€ the^finst^
j-..-£il^v^H-^
P n a°y creature o r ^ b k ^ ^ y ^ ^ s t r ^ ^ d ^ ^ e s ^
^JN^^r'-':>:;i^-' f irst child". i-Thi^ "act or behavior woultf- devafiie: d'r^
supernaturals with whom the first human baby was identified. *
Therefore, in the Navajo religious context inhumane cruelty to
children was prohibited." "Navajo Child Rearing Concepts," Child£ ^
A-3
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Abuse and Neglect - A Navajo Perspective (Navajo Childrens' Legal
Services, draft section of .a manual* for use in child welfare services, 1983).
The legal sanctions underlying the basic value of the child are spiritual, and
they in turn create restrictions on behavior as well as set down obligations
which are cultural and a part of the everyday "folk law" of the Navajo.. Navajo
Common Law is frequently expressed in terms of sacred instructional stories and
symbols, and the place of the child in Navajo society is expressed in this way:
"The special social position of an infant is illustrated
further by the symbolic significance of the manner in which the
cradle board was constructed and assembled for the first infant.
The mythological belief of the Navajo was th?t the first female
infant was conceived through the union
of the goddess Earth anci
the Heavens. *A significant other,1 a member of some centaur
generation often referred to as 'the first people,' heard an
echo of a baby cry and after a long search found an infant on a
cliff of a mesa. The discoverer then immediately designed
the
first <:>adle board with a certain 'omnipotent being1 giving her
instrt/ ions.
The main boards of the cradle were given by the earth which '
represented the soul and mind. The headboard was made fn 1 the
rainbow which stood for .abiding presence of peace ar.d beauty.
The footrests were made of sunbeams, and the lacings were zig-zag
lightening which represented power. Finally, the protective
coverings held in place by the arch represented the black clouds
or the Universe. In this sphere of protection and security of the
cradle board, the first infant was to be reared. Therefore, each
part of the cradle board had a symbolic and an important meaning.
The cradle board nurturing process is therefore considered by
Navajo as a religous ritual. Significant also is the belief that
• the acceptance of the first infant by the 'first people' was the
ancient Navajo concept of adoption." I£.
s.

."•...

Therefore we have the Navajo Common Law principles of the expectation that children.
are to be taken care of, and that obligation is not simply one of the rhild's ,
^
. w v g ^ **parents. The Navajo have very strong family and clan ties, and Dan Vicenti, a
noted commentator on Navajo Common Law, said this regarding the care of children
-_' r V

of broken homes:

'

,j... ..•.,:: -..., .'..;

•

"In the old days, and even among some of the present Navajo
families where the kinship ties are still very strong, the matter
of child support is not of paramount concern to relatives of couples

A-4
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'

.

•

•

•

r

that break apart or get a divorce, because, from the time a
child is small, he or she is treated as a son or daughter.
The child identifies with his maternal aunts or, in a lo*. of
cases, paternal aunts, as being mothers; and the term aunt
is (translated as) little mother. And if the real mother is
away for any reason at the hospital or sorr^place, they're
just taken in by the maternal aunts or paternal aunts, who are
already treating them as being their own, a member of their own
nuclear family, so that particular system took care of the
matter of child support. That is the reason why, it seems to
me, that child support or paternity suits and things like that
were never a Navajo practice, or of real concern to mothers
before, as they seem to be now." Vicenti, Jirnson, Conn and
Kellogg, II The law of the People - Dine* Bibee Haz'aanii,
—
p. 230 (1972^

€

The term "adoption" is used by Navajo commentators on Navajo Common
Law, but it is used in a different sense than that used in Anglo-European
adoption statutes:
"Orphans of Navajo families, or children of large families 'or
broken homes are adopted by other family members or a family
member of the same clan as the child." Carl N. Gorman, "The
Navajo Nation is Made up of Many Clans," (Address1 to the Navajo
Childrens* Conference, 1980); Published in Dine Center for
Human Development, For Generations to Come. . . (1932),

,
v

Navajo adoption has a different focus than Anglo-European law, i.e. it is not
principally concerned with the exchange of "legal" parents:
"Nav:jo adoption is based on need, mutual help and love. •'
Children may or may not change the surname. Either way the
family is a unit with strong, supportive, extended family and
clan ties. It has worked for hundreds of years without adoption agencies and courts of law." IdL ..
. •>
• >•

u'-:\.:.:.«.'

,•'•.•'•

yy':&r^i

Another distinctive aspect of Navajo adoption Ms that i t is not necesiafyl
permanent:

•

'V&-*}g&t&
••'•'

:

- ' < % : ; T $

"Adoption is merely a case of taking the child into the home for.'; ;a limited time, or permanently, by extending family or parental '""•'
*2_-. -• - v-agreements-depending on thft-ci.rcumstaoces^..J.hjs^hJ14J^.iri»is.eji^jtl
. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a n i d ? treated Itsronfr! s; "own;'.- ^Grandparents^Jar^.^c^tlnss-.ttTernine^^^
/~£.:-r:v*r*- —--..., v ;-y,e1f"own deceased or unwed children, or other related[family••^rry*
members." |d_.
In Navajo Common Law a child is said to be "born for", his father's clan
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and a "member" of his mother's clan.

This means that a child is an integral

part of a functioning, self-reinforcing and protecting group. . Anglo-European
law is primarily concerned with immediate parent and child relationships while
Navajo law is concerned with the relationship of a child to a group which shares
the expectation that its members will take care of each other's children.
This is not uncommon among Indian Peeves.

There is one example of

tribal court family luw policies which are based upon the common law of its
people. The termination of the parent and child relationship and adoption
(in the Anglo-European sense) is not permitted in the Makah Tribal Court in
Washington due to the perception that a child's relationship with his or her
parents and family is permanent and cannot be tampered with.

That court does

confirm custody relationships for the protection of children or where necessary
for the receipt of benefits from governmental agencies, but formal legal mechanisms
respect the basic venues of Makah common law.

Interview with the Hon. Jean

Vitalis, Juvenile Judge, Makah Tribal Court, August 17, 1983.
CONCLUSION
I believe that a correct statement of the Navajo common law of adoption
is that there is an obligation in family members (usually aunts or grandparents
or a family member who is best i

ted to assist a child) to support and assist

children in need by taking care of them for such periods of time as are necessary
under the circumstances, or permanently in the case of a permanent tragedy.

j\;\

affecting the parents. The Navajo Common Law is not concerned with the termination
of parental rights or creating a legalistic parent and child relationship because
those concepts are irrelevant in a system which has obligations to children ...
that extend beyond the parents. Therefore, upon the inability of the parents
to assist a child or following the occurrence of a family tragedy, children are

A-6
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•,

' .

•>"•

"adopted" by family meirhers for care which may be temporary or permanent,
depending upon the circumstances.

The mechanism is informal and practical, and v

based upon community expectations founded in religious and cultural belief.
DATED: September 19, 1983.

Solici'tp^to the Courts/bf the Navajo NVtiion

This opinion is hereby approved.

^2^2^=i _

Chief Justice^of the Navajo Nation

l wini9i Lt»
TRUc AriD <-•
THE iNSTfc-*
iRiS Cf
C S T S * " Cf 1* N*

<

, ; 0 '•'-

.u..y
'":^::,r['S.z]
,*- —

•

v .

•>•„•*"?

• v^S-'f-" . V

v.v**

• " • ' • • • _

' ."•;-*
.»

•X&AZ?}**]$•
;
' V : /•'-••>»
-J*w&a
-'* T.-V^IJ

• » —

- » - . . — <*-. •

-3*.

- I . - -" "^-^isv.:

—

• "v v- r>~.';

.

«

'•

• .-,a=a

•

—^ "7-7--—* '
** - J'^,_^*;-_ ^," .r—w"",' T2' \1r '• *.
tTVT^*^r^^y--Y-^ -"- — "^* '* ~-^g£Z23
'
Crr.i**^*
.•- : > v ; » - . i - . : : ::->»
.-*****i.
r3*»^-r- +\~^£ZA^~; - ^ - « j » • - -•* —-• .
* ..;rX7?" T . T J^7 ^ ^
--- •- i.-.jrr" iz
^ ^ ^ T V ™ ^ • " V i r ^ r r ^ c-«^>^ j_fc.^£»v«5;
yZ-iV^^'r ''v.k*-isH „:
jr~%r

o
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter A-7
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "C"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

£ l X k i l - * » *•* «*• *

POU*TW JUD4QAI DtSTXCt COL :
0 * TH| STATI Of UTAH
IN AND fO«

UUM

COWNTY

FILED
n*M&tmo
RICHARD L. MAXFIELD o£
MAXFIELD AND GAMMON
tIUMA, ^
Attorney for Petitonera
*
60 Beat 100 South, Bui**
_
/ft
Provo, Utah 84601
Telt 374-6272
XM THE FOURTH JTOICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH I. I I'l I f
STATI, Of 'UTAH

In the Matter 61

u.ii

i

(11 nun a(II

i n Opel* Loijjt
explained to

MI i

hii I »i pi)f mi i>

*i

'

/ ?

9

r

? /
p

th> n rider eigi&etl, 'Nphiq I he n a t u x a l it* ' ' * »

mi in mi mii N i"i11" named minor en i ni 1
jqiti

rtii

ria v i mi a p p e a r e d

i j ^ h t i an 1 r e i p o n i i b i 111 i r»§
i 1 ^ ""fill c o n s e q u e n t e a . u l

nei e t y cnnseni

t ha r ny minor

child

J e r e m i a h H a l l o v a y , may be • % \~ t etl by ian i i w n \ n .en dud Pali i
Hawkini Car t a r ,

ftp*

AD
OF
PU
T IUOPN
W
3U

'

1 rra 11 i ii*tj t h t e l f e t l

my l i g n i n q t i n t imniMii

illuiill II

i

iiin'i IIAMIH) lull iiif
"i

i ii

Il

A Minor,

til

HIJ ,i , M
IJ i

*'

%a.

mi i %t in I | u II

m

,toption of;

JEREMIAH HALL0HAY,
m

m

' h e l e t i t loner • h r i e , "

doipcj t h l e f u l l | null r f e e if ami «i timm

liaiel.'i a ' a t t
in tin

i

1

Mia .

r in* i i f Hu#i n

o f a n y p« i IOJI w h o m s o e v e r .

DATED and a i q n e d i n Open Court ••hie

uy^

^fe:

CECELIA ANN DICK
"

i2^£.

c i i: iii fil mn el iiii 1 :;i in , i i 1: IIIfc i: i iiii i i i ii irii Open C o u r t t h i m

J • ** day o f f laf ,

111 1 Ill 0 •

ST THE COURT:

Sfrnt

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter A-8
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT "D"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

* L,Ji y.HU.SN.CLfc l .

In the Fourth Judicial District C o o r t ^ 5 - — ^ of the SUtt of Utah
In tnd For Utah County

MINUTE INTET
CASCNUMlt*

ADOPTION OF:

19,981

D A T E D May 30. 1980
David Saw
JUDGE
Richard L. Maxfield, Atty.
Reported by Rick Tatton, C.S.R.

JEREMIAH HALLOWAY

CONSENT OF NATURAL MOTHER
This matter came before the court for hearing the consent of the
natural mother to the adoption of the above named child. Richard L.
Maxfield appeared as legal counsel for the petitioners, Dan Lewis Carter
and Patricia Hawkins Carter.
The natural mother was sworn and testified 1n her own behalf and
executed her Consent to Adoption in open court. The court affixed its
signature to the same, finding 1t to be freely and voluntarily given
with a full knowledge of the consequences.
Before allowing the adoption to proceed, counsel is to cor*ply
with U.S. Code in obtaining consent from the natural mother's indian
tribe.
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EXHIBIT B
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OP THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

,r

•'

" Jfip£

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH

R U L I N G

HALLCWAY

#

19,961

Having now considered the arguments of counsel and the memoranda of law on f i l e herein together with the a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s of the Indian Child Welfare Act, the court now h o l d s , r u l e s ,
and f i n d s as f o l l o w s t
RULING
Under the facts and.circumstances of this case as have now
been presented to the court and considering the applicable law as
it relates thereto, the court finds the domicile of the minor child
to be that of the petitioners. This finding is based upon the fact
that the child's residence appears to have been voluntarily and
purposely removed from the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation
to the petitioners. In view of that fact and the long period of tune
that the child has been with the petitioners, this court finds that
apparent "good cause** exists for this court to take jurisdiction and
that the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act have at this
stage of the proceedings been satisfied in order to do so.
Accordingly, this court will proceed to now take evidence on the
issue of domicile if any further evidence need be presented as to
that issue and also on the issue of abandonment by the natural mother.
Evidentiary hearing on those issues will be set upon application of
either party which application should also indicate the length of
tune estimated for said hearing. Temporary custody of the minor
child to remain with the petitioners until further order of the
cour t.

DISTRICT JUDGE

rtzn
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a

* H O W A R D . LEWIS *

FtTtR&tn

ATTOHNCY* AND C O U N C I L O R S AT LAW
t a o 1 A * T BOO N o r r N ftmanr

p. O. » o i 7 7 *

2

PROVO. U T A H » 4 1 0 1
TIUIFMON*: S 7 S . t S 4 t

3
4
5

Attorney, for P E t i t i o n e r s

6

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8
9

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
O R D E R
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY,

10

A person under eighteen vears
11 of age,

12
13
14

Probate No. 19,981

This matter came on before the Court for hearing on the 7th o
April, 1983 and the 16th dav of September, 1983.

The petitioners,

Dan Carter and Pat Carter were present at the April 7th hearing

15
and represented by their attorney, Richard 3. Johnson.

The Navajc

16
Nation was present and represented bv its attornevs, Craig Jay

17
Dorsav and Larry Kee Yazzie.

The Court, on the basis of testi-

18
mony, evidence and the argument of counsel, now makes and enters

19
the following Order:

20
1.

In the Court's prior ruling of Julv 14, 1982, the Court

21
both sides the opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing on t
22
issue of jurisdiction.

The Coui;tf after considering the evidence

23
finds that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as an

24
adverse proceeding for termination of parental rights and adoptic

25
of an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reserva-

26

tion of the Indian child1 s tribe.

27
2.

The Court specifically finds that the child was taken f

28
29
Tftl
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1 the reservation by a family member, with some of the family's con

2 sent and delivered to the petitioners, for adoption. The Court
3 finds that the transfer of the child to the petitioners by the
4 biological family of the child was done in .what some members of tl
5 family felt was the child's best interests. The Court finds that
6 bo one in the familv of the child protested placement of the child
7 [with the petitioners.
8

3.

The Court finds that the relocation of the child with the

9 petititoners was done with the intent to transfer to the Carters
10 full parental rights as it relates to the child and with the furth
11 jintent to abandon all parental rights in the child.
12

4.

The Court finds further that the natural mother and the

13 family have abandoned the child and that prior to the Court's
14 (awarding of temporary custody of the minor child to the petitioner)
15 on July 14, 1982, the petitioners stood in the position of loco
16 parentis to Jeremiah Halloway.
17

5.

The Court finds further that on the basis of the Court's

18 ^determination of domicile and the Court's finding that the child <
19 ({had a residence with the petitioners in Utah Countv. State of Utah,
20 the Court finds further that there is good cause pursuant to
I

21
22

[25 U.S.C.S. 51911(b) for this Court to retain jurisdiction based

i

(upon the findings of the Court that there .has been a long period of
23n t ime that the child has been with the petitioners; the fact that nc
24 Hindian custodian has been appointed and that the custody and
251

««l
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1

parental rights to the child had been voluntarily relinquished by

2

the parents and family; that the child has had little contact with

3

the tribe for a significant period of time; that the child has not

4

resided on the reservation for a significant period of time and

5

that the child has significant contact with this district; and, that

6

the convenience and assessibility of witnesses best able to deter-

7

mine the status, condition and health of the child are located in

8

this district.

9

6.

The Court makes no ruling with respect to termination of

10 parental rights as it relates to Jeremiah Halloway, the Court
11 determining that the petitioners must meet the burden of 25 U.S.C.
12 §1912(f) by proving bevond a resonable doubt from the evidence,
13 including testinonv of qualified expert witnesses, that the
14 continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custody is

s: is likelv

;*?

"i^ 16 child.

to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
The Court will be guided bv the Indian Child Welfare Act

M *• A

« 17 25 U.S.C.S. §1901 et seq. and those matters contemplated bv said
°.o|
J* 18 Act.
19

7.

The Court finds that the natural mother has withdrawn hei

20 consent prior to the entry of a Decree of Adoption.
21

8.

Accordingly, the Court orders that the matter be set for

22 hearing at a time convenient for counsel to determine whether or
23 not parental rights should be terminated.
24

9.

The Court notes the stipulation of the parties recognizi

25
26
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1 the rights of the Court to enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions c

z
3

Law and Decree in this matter after a hearing of all of the evid
10.

The Court orders that the records previously ordered t

4 become part of the record on April 7. 1983 hearing be made part
5 this record.
6

11.

All motions for sanctions are, as of the present time,

7 denied.
8

Odttba.4-,

,
DATED this

/>

9

day of Irprpml-rr, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

10
11 APPROVED AS TO FORM:
12
13

McZ'bAVtbiA

3£

AVW^MV^
14 CB3C
15

*?

16 LARRY KEE YAZZIE
17 Attorneys for Navajo Nation
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
A-14
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH
HALLOWAY, A PERSON
UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF
AGE

D E C I S I O N
#19,981

FEDERAL

LAW

This case is before the Court on petitioner's Motion to Terminate
the Parental Rights of the Natural Mother of Jeremiah Halloway, a
Navajo Indian Child.
Child Welfare Act.

The controlling law in this case is the Indian
The portions of that act we are specifically con-

cerned with are the following:
25 U.S.C. S e c 1912(d)
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
25 U.S.C. S e c . 1 9 1 2 ( f )
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of
qualified expert w i t n e s s e s , that the continued custocfy of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physicial damage to the child.
The child was placed with the petitioners on March 23, 1980; the
biological mother consented to the adoption of the child on May 30, 1980,
The petitioners notified the Navajo Nation of their intent to adopt the
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PAGE TWO
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child and on April 30, 1982 the mother revoked her consent to the
adoption.

Testimony was taken on these matters on April 7, 1983 and

trial was held on October 22, 1984.
Testimony of experts concerning the effect of taking the child
from the petitioner's home and replacing him in the reservation is
summarized here.

Damage to the Child

Paul Steven Buckingham
Mr. Buckingham interviewed the petitioners and Jeremiah. He found
no signs of depression or identity crisis.

(October transcript page

65).

He found them to be extremely bonded (October transcript page

68).

He found that to return the child to the reservation would cause

at worst "tremendous physhological damage, emotional damage, from the
fact that he has been taken from the home that he felt loved and bonde<
to and put in a home where there was a ^ery
the y/ery

least for neglect and at the yery

(October transcript page

lost [sic] potential at
most of

physical abuse."

77)

The Navajo Nation has challenged the testimony of Mr. Buckingham
on the grounds that he did not have sufficient qualifications to testil
as an expert under the ICWA
out as follows:

Mr. Buckingham's qualifications were set

Bachelors Degree in Science and Psychology from BYU

1972; Masters of Social Work from the University of Utah in 1974;
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Clinical Worker for L.D.S. Social Services for last eight years;
case worker in the Indian Placement Program for Navajo children.
has also worked with Navajo children on the reservation.
a Navajo youth in his home for the last five years.

He has had

These are ample

qualifications in light of In the Matter of K.A.B.E. and K.B.E,
NW2d 840 (S.D. 1982).

He

325

In that case, the South Dakota Supreme Court

found that a person who had worked as a social worker for over four
years, had a bachelor of arts degree in social work and had contact
with Indians on a regular basis was a qualified expert under the

ICWA.

See also, In re the Welfare of Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. App. 1982).

Dr. Robert M. Crist

Dr. Robert M. Crist also testified regarding the effect of returning the child to the reservation.

He stated that "the likelihood of

that is very great that you would be rupturing the child-parent bond
which is one of those primary necessary developments in young people
and children.
for him.

You would be placing him in a new strange environment

There would be a questions as to who would be the*parent

figures in the future."

Again, the Navajo Nation challenged Dr.

Crist's qualifications to testify as an expert.

While the witness's

experience had not been with Navajo people per se, his work in psychiatry and minority integration are sufficient to qualify him to
testify.
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Dr. Samuel Roll

Dr. Samuel Roll, called on behalf of the Navajo Nation, submitted
a report (Exhibit 4) based upon his evaluation of the child and background information supplied by counsel for the tribe.

Dr. Roll found

that the child is mildly depressed and that he has a negative image of
Indians.

With regard to the child's attachment to the petitioners,

Dr. Rol1 found that

Jeremiah is ^ery closely and warmly bonded and attached
to the Carters. It is clear that he sees them as faithful
and powerful sources of stimulation, confidence and security.
He also looks to them for positive productive discipline. His
love and bonding to them very strongly speaks to the value that
the relationship with the Carters has for him. It will be extremely difficult for Jeremiah to make a break with the Carters
and will cause considerable pain and a period of painful mourning. It is clear that Jeremiah will not be able to go through
this period successfully without close supervision and professional help.
Nevertheless, Dr. Roll's opinion was that the child should be taken
from the petitioner's home and replaced with the tribe so that he would
not suffer an identify crisis in his adolescent years.

Dr. Robert J. Howell

Testimony and a report (Exhibit 3) prepared by Dr. Robert J.
Howell reveal that after his examination of the child, and conversations with the child's teachers and the petitioners, he formed a professional opinion as to the effect of removing the child from his
A-18
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present

circumstances:

It is my opinion that the probability of emotional
damage taking place which would result from removing Mich?*]
from the Carter home, far outweighs the potential conflict
as to Michael['s] not having a clear identity of himself as
an Indian, and yet, also knowing that he is not Caucasion.
It is my belief that the probability of emotional damage is
at a ^ery high level of certainty--beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, Dr. Howell's findings were as follows:
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no memory of
his life for, two years and ten months on the reservation.
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home that he is now
in and sees Mr. and Mrs. Carter as his parents.
In my opinion,
the Carters are his psychological parents.
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be emotionally
damaged by taking him out of the home. The nearly five years
that he has spent with the Carters, especially, when considering the early age that he came with them, clearly speaks to
the importance of his continuing to live with them.
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that effort should be made to
inculcate in Michael an appreciation for his heritage, and I
see no reason why contact could not be effected between Cecelia
Sanders and Michael.
5. I could not find any evidence that Michael was depressed, if he was depressed when Dr. Roll saw him, it is likely
that this was a reaction to his fears that he would be taken
away from the Carters. He told his school teacher Paula Farrer
that he was going to see a man to determine if he could keep
living with the carters.
In addition to the testimony of experts regarding the effect of
removing the child from the petitioner's home, there was (in the April
hearing) some testimony regarding the fitness of his Indian custodians.
In In the Matter of J.H.L. and P.L.L.H., 316 NW2d 650 (S.D. 1982)
the court found that evidence of conduct of not only the natural
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but also "other persons in and about the residence" may support a
trial court's finding that severe emotional or physical damage would
be likely if the child were returned to the natural parents, Jjd.at 651
In the present case, the record indicates that the child's grandmother
and other members of the extended family are alcoholic (April transcri
pages 23-25,30);

the natural mother's husband did not like the child

nor did he want him in the marital relationship (April transcript page
21-23); the natural mother willingly gave the child up for adoption
(April transcript page 31) and only revoked her consent to the adoptioi
after the Navajo Nation indicated its disapproval of the adoption.
There is

also testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the mother

revoked her consent only after being subject to duress by the Navajo
Nation. (April transcript pages 60-62).
An Arizona court has held that an Indian mother who revokes her
relinquishment of parental rights is entitled to the return of the
child in the absence of evidence of her fitness as a parent or any
attempt to preserve the parent-child relationship.
Pima County, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981).

Matter of Appeal in

In that case, the court

also seemed to belittle the adoptive parent's argument that return of
the child would be emotionally traumatic:
Any potential emotional trauma to the child if the contemplated adoption is aborted was engendered by the conduct
of the adoptive parents not adhering to the mandates of the
Act.
Id. at 193.
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The relevant facts in the present case are quite different and

distinguishable from Matter of Appeal,

In that case the adoptive parent

had had custody of the child for only about four months before the natural mother revoked her relinquishment.

In the case at bar, the pe-

titioners had custody of the child for a full two years before there
was any indication that the natural mother would revoke her consent to
the adoption.

At that time the child had already developed emotional

and psychological bonds with the petitioners and it would be unfair to
punish the child because the adoptive parents did not send him off to
the reservation immediately upon hearing that the biological mother had
changed her mi nd.
Rehabilitative Efforts
In the first hearing conducted on April 7, 1983, the natural
mother testified that the primary care of Jeremiah after the initial
six month period was with the child's Indian grandmother (Page 20).
She testified that at the time physical custody of the child was transferred to the grandmother, the step-father was apparently abusing
Jeremiah,
20).

He did not like the child because it was not his son (Page

In addition, he stated he was not going to bother with the child

and would not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the chil
the normal love that a father would give a child (Pages 22-23).
The mother testified that there was only one sister who would tak
the child and she was determined not to be fit (Pages 45-46).
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The most important testimony concerning the frustrated rehabilitation in the case comes from Ms. Ella Shirley- On page 86 of the
transcript, she explains the shared care concept.

In her testimony,

she stated that if the natural parents could not take care of the chil
then the extended family would then be charged with the care.

Ms.

Shirley testified specifically that there was a maternal aunt and
sister who could be used.

However, the record clearly indicates the

unsuitabi1ity of all of the extended family.

On page 108 of the trans

cript, the social worker was asked questions as to what decision she
would have made as far as rehabilitation of the family unit or placement in 1980.

Starting on page 109 she was asked that if

the facts

revealed that the members of the extended family who wanted the child
were not fit custodians, would adoption outside the Tribe be considered
The social worker testified that they would simply place the child with
another Navajo family.

The social worker admits based upon those facts

rehabilitation with the natural family would have been discontinued and
the child would have been placed with another Navajo family.

The socia

worker agreed that from the notes of the case worker it appeared that
the natural mother vascilated continually between wanting thje child
back and not wanting the child (Page 112).
Another social worker testified that the first referral to the
social agencies was because Jeremiah was neglected (Page 119). The
social worker stated that "they were interested in taking the child,
but after doing a thorough investigation of the sisters, we decided

A-22
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that placement with those relatives would not work (Page 120).
Accordingly, the court finds that the burden of rehabilitation and
working with the family has been met.
STATE LAW
In addition to the provisions of the ICWA, the State of Utah has
set forth certain requirements which must be met before the rights of
a parent may be terminated.

One of the things that satisfy state re-

quirements for termination is abandonment.

Utah Code Annotated Sec.

78-3a-48(l) states in relevant part:
The court may decree an involuntary termination of all parental
rights with respect to one or both parents if the court finds . ,
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned the chtld. It
shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or
parents, although having legal custody of the child have surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period of six
months following such surrender have not manifested to the child
or to the person having the physical custody of the child a firrr
intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for
the care of the chi Id . . .
Under,

the guidelines laid down by the above statute, the

natural mother's sustained absence of any showing of interest in the
child for a two year

period establishes prima facie evidence of aban-

donment.
In State v. J.T, 578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978) the State Division
of Family Services had placed children of the-litigant mother in
foster homes after she had released them to the agency.
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attempts to remain in contact with her children, the state refused to
tell her where the two youngest were.

Consequently, she had no contac

with them for two and one-half years.

Eventually, when the mother

sought custody of the children, the State sought to terminate her
parental rights on the basis of abandonment.

The Supreme Court found

that there could be no abandonment where everytime the parent sought tc
see the children she was denied visitation.
In the case before the court, the mother knew that the petitioners
had the child and at all times relevant to this action their phone
number and address were 1isted in the telephone directory, nevertheless,
she made no attempt to contact the child.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the court finds 1)

that the evidence

(including expert testimony) established beyond a reasonable doubt
that to return Jeremiah to his Indian custodians would result in serious
emotional or physical damage to him; 2)

that active efforts have been

undertaken to attempt the rehabilitation of the Indian family and have
failed; and 3)

that the biological mother knowingly and voluntarily

abandoned the child as defined in Utah Code Annoted Sec. 78-3a-48(l).
Accordingly, the amended petition of adoption is granted.
Dated this

,1/*" day of January, 1985.

/0 :.S./

._.

DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NAVAJO KattVft* ffcCK. A?i:ov
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP WINDOW ROCK, ARIZOI'A

IN THE HATTER OF:

)
)
JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, DOB: 5/14/77
) Ho. VR-JV-CV-71-^
)
A person under eighteen years of age. )
ORDER

This matter having come before the Court this 12th day of October, at
8:30 am, those present being Craig J. Dorsay, counsel for the Kavajo
Nation; no representative for respondents Dan and Patricia Carter appearing
before the Court; testimony having been presented and arguments trade; and
the Court hereby being fully advised in the premises:
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS
1. That Jeremiah Halloway, DOB: S/14/77, is tat enrolled Navajo child,
C# 427.273.
2.

That Jeremiah Halloway vas born out of wedlock to Cecelia (Celine)

Dick, now known as Cecelia Saunders, an enrolled member of the Navajo
Tribe, C# 122,217, in Iyanbito, Hew Mexico.
3.

That Cecelia Saunders has always been and still is a domiciliary

and resident of the Havejo reservation.
4. That child-rearing of Jeremiah was shared between Cecelia Saunders
and members of her extended family on the reservation, from his birth until
March of 1980.
5. That Jarealah * u roaoved froo the reservation fcy a asternal aunt,
folly Ann Dick, la March, 1980, and vas transported to Utah for placeaent
la a non-Indian prospective adoptive family.
i
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6.

That the consent of the internal grandmother Bessie Bt(\?y, in

whose here Jercniah then rcrided, wif rot obtained for such removal.
7.

T!.ct re crcer vas obtained from the courts of the Navajo Nction

authcrizinp removal of Jeremiah from the reservation.
Rm

Tnpt

Cecejie Saunders vas transported to Provo, Utah, ct the

expense of the adoptive parents to execute a written consent to adoption of
Jeremiah Hallcvay.
9.

That under the Navajo Tribal Code, 7 K.T.C. f 253 and 9 K.T.C. f

1053, and pursuart to Navajo common lav, the donicile of Jereniah Hallovay
has at all times remained within the boundaries of the reservation.
10.

That under Navajo statutes and common law, the courts of the

Navajo Nation have exclusive Jurisdiction

to determine the custody of

Jeremiah Halloway.
IK

That 7 N.T.C. f 204 directs that in all civil cases the Court of

the Navajo Tribe shall apply any lavs of the United States that may be
applicable.
12.

That the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICVA), 25 USC If

1901*1963, applies to this proceeding and Is Incorporated by reference.
13.

That under the ICWA, 25 USC f 1911(a), the courts of the Navajo

Nation have exclusive Jurisdiction over Jeremiah Halloway.
14.

That under the ICVA, 25 USC If 1913(a), 1914, this Court is a

court of competent Jurisdiction.
15.

.

That on July 14, 1982, and October 6, 1983, the District Court of

Utah County, State of Utah, In Probate No. 19981, entered orders holding
that the Navajo Ration did not have exclusive jurisdiction over Jeremiah
Halloway and that the State of Utah should retain Jurisdiction to decide
his custody.
16.

That these orders by the District Court of the State of Utah are
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1

in violation of the statutes. common lav and public policy of the Navajo

2

Nation, which confirms the exclusive Jurisdiction of the tribe over Jeresiah

3

Hallovay.

4

17.

That these orders by the District Court of Dtah were in violation

of the exclusive Jurisdiction section of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25

6

OSC I 1911(a), as veil as other applicable sections of that statute.

7

18.

That a proceeding vas commenced under the Indian Child Welfare

8

Act, 25 USC I 1914, and the Navajo Tribal Code, In this Court on August 6,

9

1984, to invalidate the Utah State proceeding, Ho. 19,981.

10

19.

That this Court haa Jurisdiction over the respondents, Dan and

11

Patricia Carter, under 9 N.T.C. I 1055(c), vhich provides for Jurisdiction

12

over any adult vho removes a Havajo child from the custody of the parent

13

and detains such child after demands are made for the return of the child.

14

20.

15

That respondents Dan and Patricia Carter have refused to return

the child to the Navajo reservation.

16

21*

That personal service of process of the Hot ion to Invalidate on

17

Dan and Patricia Carter vas authorised by order of this Court on August 9,

18

1984.

19

22.

20

That the interests of the Navajo Nation in Jeremiah Hallovay are

sufficient to authorize the service of process beyond reservation boundar-

21

ies.

22

23.

That return of service for the Motion to Invalidate, supporting
*
*

23

brief and Notice of Rearing on respondents Dan and Patricia Carter in

24

Spanish Fork Utah has been filed vith this Court.

25

24.

%*

process la this proceeding and have chosen not to appaar before thia Court.
IT 18 THEREFORE ORDERED* ADJUDGED AID DECREED:

27
28
vuottmoa
an vjana

That respondents Dan and Patricia Carter have been afforded due

1. Under tha statutes and coupon law of the lavajo Nation, and under

I
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1

the Indicr; Ch'H Welfare Act of 1978, this Court has exclufive Jurisdiction

2

tc determine the custody and disposition of Jereciah Hallovay, DOB: 5/14/77,

3

C# 427.273.

4

2.

Tha District Court for Utah County, State of Otah, Probate No.

5

19,°M, vr- without subject natter Jurisdiction to receive the consent to

6

adoption

7

respondents Den and Patricia Carter, and to enter any orders involving the

8

custody cl Jeremiah Hallovay.

9

3.

froa Cecelia Saunders, to entertain the adoption petition of

The actions of the District Court for Utah County, State of Utah,

10

Probate No. 19,981 are In violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act and are

11

hereby Invalidated pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC f 1914.

12

4.

The Navajo Division of Social Welfare and Department of Justice

13

shall take all necessary steps to secure the return of Jeremiah Hallovay to

14

the Navajo reservation.

15

5.

A hearing to decide the permanent custody of Jeremiah Hallovay

16

ahall be scheduled in this Court upon his return to the reservation.

17

Respondents Dan and Patricia Carter shall present

18

Adoption to this Court at that time.

19
20

6.

their Petition for

Counsel for the Navajo Nation shall prepare Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Lav for the Court by October 29, 1984.

21

7. Because of the serious nature of this proceeding and the fact that

22

It la a case of first Impression In this Court or any other court in the

23

United States, this Court will Issue an opinion supporting this Order In

24

the near future.

OtDERED this

26

It
&Eday of October, 1984.

27

-.:.„•::

28
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Federal Register / Vol. 44, No. 228 / Monday, November 28,1979 /Notices

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian
Child Custody Proceedings
This notice is published in exercise of
authority delegated by the Secretary of
the Interior to the Assistant Secretary—
Indian Affairs by 209 DM 8.
There was published in the Federal
Register, Vol. 44, No. 79/Monday, April
23,1979 a notice entitled Recommended
Guidelines for State Courts—Indian
Child Custody Proceedings. This notice
pertained directly to implementation of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
Pub. L 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069. 25 U.S.C
1901 et scq. A subsequent Federal
Register notice which invited public
comment concerning the above was
published on June 5,1379. As a result of
comments received, the recommended
guidelines were revised and are
provided below in final form.
Introduction
Although the rulemaking procedures
of the Administrative Procedures Act
have been followed in developing these
guidelines, they are not published as
regulations because they are not
intended to have binding legislative
effect. Many of these guidelines
represent the interpretation of !he
Interior Department of certain
provisions of the Act. Other guidelines
provide procedures which, if followed,
will help assure that rights guaranteed
by the Act are protected when state
courts decide Indian child custody
matters. To the extent that the
Department's interpretations of the Act
are correct, contrary interpretations by
the courts would be violations of the
Act. If procedures different from those
recommended in these guidelines are
adopted by a state, their adequacy to
protect rights guaranteed by the Act will
have to be judged on their own merits.
Where Congress expressly delegates
to the Secretary the primary
responsibility for interpreting a statutory
term/regulations interpreting that terra
have legislative effect. Courts are not
free to set aside those regulations simply
because they would have interpreted
that statute in a different manner.
Where, however, primary responsibility
for interpreting a statutory term rests
with the courts, administrative
interpretations of statutory terms are
given important but not controlling
significance. Dattcrton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 410, 424-425 (1977).
In other words, when the Department
writes rules needed to carry out

responsibilities Congress has explicity
imposed on the Department, those rules
are binding. A violation of those rules is
a violation of the law. When, however,
the Department writes rules or
guidelines advising some other agency
how it should carry out responsibilities
explicitly assigned to it by Congress,
those rules or guidelines are not, by
themselves, binding. Courts will take
what this Department has to say into
account in such instances, but they are
free to act contrary to what the
Department has said if they are
convinced that the Department's
guidelines are not required by the
statute itself.
Portions of the Indian Child Welfare
Act do expressly delegate to the
Secretary of the Interior responsibility
for interpreting statutory language. For
example, under 25 U.S.C. 1918. the
Secretary is directed to determine
whether a plan for reassumption of
jurisdiction is "feasible" as that term is
used in the statute. This and other areas
where primary responsibility for
implementing portions of the Act rest
with this Department, are covered in
regulations promulgated on July 31,1979,
at 44 FR 45092.
Primary responsibility for interpreting
other language used in the Act. however,
rests with the courts that decide Indian
child custody cases. For example, the
legislative history of the Act states
explicitly that the use of the term "good
cause" was designed to provide state
courts with flexibility in determining the
disposition of a placement proceeding
involving an Indian child. S. Rep. No.
95-597, 95th Cong.. 1st Scss. 17 (1977).
The Department's interpretation of
statutory language of this type is
published in these guidelines.
Some commenters asserted that
Congressional delegation to this
Department of authority to promulgate
regulations with binding legislative
effect with respect to all provisions of
the Act is found at 25 U.S.C 1952, which
states, "Within one hundred and eighty
days after November 8,1978, the
Secretary shall promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter."
Promulgation of regulations with
legislative effect with respect to most of
the responsibilities of state or tribal
courts under the Act, however, is not
necessary to carry out the Act. State and
tribal courts are fully capable of
carrying out the responsibilities imposed
on them by Congress without being
under the direct supervision of this
Department.
Nothing in the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended this
Department to exercise supervisory

control over state or tribal courts or to
legislate for them with respect to Indian
child custody matters. For Congress to
assign to an administrative agency such
supervisory control over courts would
be an extraordinary step.
Nothing in the language or legislative
history of 25 U.S.C. 1952 compels the
conclusion that Congress intended to
vest this Department with such
extraordinary power. Both the language
and the legislative history indicate that
the purpose of that section was simply
to assure that the Department moved
promptly to promulgate regulations to
carry out the responsibilities Congress
had assigned it under the Act.
Assignment of supervisory authority
over the courts to an administrative
agency is a measure so at odds with
concepts of both federalism and
separation of powers that it should not
be imputed to Congress in the absence
of an express declaration of
Congressional intent to that effect.
Some commenters also recommended
that the guidelines be published as
regulations and that the decision of
whether the law permits such
regulations to be binding be left to the
court. That approach has not been
adopted because the Department has an
obligation not to assert authority that it
concludes it does not have.
Each section of the revised guidelines
is accompanied by commentary
explaining why the Department believes
states should adopt that section and to
provide some guidance where the
guidelines themselves may need to be
interpreted in the light of specific
circumstances.
The original guidelines used the word
"should" instead of "shall" in most
provisions. The term "should" was used
to communicate the fact that the
guidelines were the Department's
interpretations of the Act and were not
intended to have binding legislative
effect. Many commenters, however,
interpreted the use of "should" as an
attempt by this Department to make
statutory requirements themselves
optional That was not the intent If a
state adopts those guidelines, they
should be stated in mandatory terms.
For that reason the word "shall" has
replaced "should" in the revised
guidelines. The status of these
guidelines as interpretative rather than
legislative in nature is adequately set
out in 4he introduction.
In some instances a state may wish to
establish rules that provide even greater
protection for rights guaranteed by the
Act than those suggested by these
guidelines. These guidelines are not
intended to discourage such action. Cart
should be taken, however, that the
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Office of the Field Solicitor. Department of
the Interior. Room 7102. Federal Building I
Courthouse, 500 Cold Avenue, S.W.,
Albuquerque. New Mexico 87101, (505)
766-2547.
Office of the Field Solicitor. Department of
the Interior, P.O. Box 397, W.CD. Office
Building. Route 1. Anadarko, Oklahoma
73005. (405) 247-0673.
Office of the Field Solicitor. Department of
the Interior. P.O. Box 1508. Room 319,
Federal Building. 5th and Broadway.
Muskogee. Oklahoma 74401. (918) 683-3111.
Office of the Field Solicitor, Department of
the Interior, c/o Osage Agency, Grandview
Avenue. Pawhuska. Oklahoma 74056, (918)
207-2431.
Office of the Regional Solicitor, Department
of the Interior, Suite 6201. Federal Building.
125 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84138, (801) 524-5677.
Office of the Regional Solicitor. Department
of the Interior, Lloyd 500 Building, Suite
607.500 N.E. Multnomah Street, Portland,
Oregon 97232. (503) 231-2125.
Guidelines for State Courts
A. Policy
B. Pre-trial requirements
1. Determination that child is an Indian
2. Determination of Indian child's tribe
3. Determination that placement is covered
by the Act
4. Determination of jurisdiction
5. Notice requirements
6. Time limits and extensions
7. Emergency removal of an Indian child
8. Improper removal from custody
C Requests for transfer to tribal court
1. Petitions under 25 U.S.C. { 1911(b) for
transfer of proceeding
2. Criteria and procedures for ruling on 25
U.S.C 11911(b) transfer petitions
3. Determination of good cause to the
contrary
4. Tribal court declination of transfer
0. Adjudication of involuntary placements,
adoptions or terminations of parental
rights
1. Access to reports
2. Efforts to alleviate need to remove child
from parents or Indian custodians
3. Standards of evidence
4. Qualified expert witnesses
E. Voluntary proceedings
1. Execution of consent
2. Content of consent document
3. Withdrawal of consent to placement
4. Withdrawal of consent to adoption
F. Dispositions
1. Adoptive placements
2. Foster care or pre-adoptive placements
3. Good cause to modify preferences
G. Post-trial rights
1. Petition to vacate adoption
2. Adult adoptee rights
3. Notice of change in child's status
4. Maintenance ol records
A. Policy
*(1) Congress through the Indian Child
Welfare Act has expressed its clear
preference for keeping Indian children
with their families, deferring to tribal
judgment on matters concerning the
custody of tribal children* and placing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU.children who must be removed
Indian
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from their homes within their own

>vision of additional protections to
ne parties to a child custody
needing does not deprive other
rties of rights guaranteed to them by
• Act.
n some instances the guidelines do
!e more than restate the statutory
Suage. This is done in order to make
guidelines more complete so that
y can be followed without the need
«;fer to the statute in every instance,
ission of any statutory language, of
:rse. does not in any way affect the
Micability of the statute.
\ number of commenters
ommended that special definitions of
dence and domicile be included in
• guidelines. Such definitions were not
luded because these terms are well
ned under existing state law. There
o indication that these state law
initions tend to undermine in any
y the purposes of the A c t
ommending special definitions for
purpose of this Act alone would
ply provide unnecessary
^plications in the law.
\ number of commenters
ommended that the guidelines
ude recommendations for tribal-state
cements under 25 U.S.C 1919. A
nber of other commenters, however,
cized the one provision in the
inal guidelines addressing that
ject as tending to impose on such
cements restrictions that Congress
: not intend should be imposed
ause of the wide variation in the
ations and attitudes of states and
es, it is difficult to deal with that
e in the context of guidelines. The
artment is currently developing
orials to aid states and tribes with
* agreements. The Department hopes
: jve those materials available later
year. For these reasons, the
ision in the original guidelines
cerning tribal-state agreements has
n deleted from the guidelines,
he Department has also received
:y requests for assistance from tribal
ts in carrying out the new
onsibilities resulting from the
,age of this A c t The Department
nds to provide additional guidance
!
assistance in that area also in the
?. Providing guidance to state
s was given a higher priority
-i.jse the Act imposes many more
<*dures on state courts than it does
ibai courts.
fciny commenters have urged the
? irtment to discuss the effect of the
on the financial responsibilities of
•?s and tribes to provide services to
<n children. Many such services are
• d in large part by the Department
ealth. Education, and Welfare. The
ies and regulations of that

Department will have a significant
impact on the issue of financial
responsibility. Officials of Interior and
HEW will be discussing this issue with
each other. It is anticipated that more
detailed guidance on questions of
financial responsibility will be provided
as a result of those consultations.
One commenter recommended that
the Department establish a monitoring
procedure to exercise its right under 25
U.S.C. 1915(e) to review state court
placement records. HEW currently
reviews state placement records on a
systematic basis as part of its
responsibilities with respect to statutes
it administers. Interior Department
officials are discussing with HEW
officials the establishment of a
procedure for collecting data to review
compliance with the Indian Child
Welfare A c t
Inquiries concerning these %
recommended guidelines may be
directed to the nearest of the following
regional and field offices of the Solicitor
for the Interior Department:
Office of the Regional Solicitor, Department
of the Interior. 510 L Street. Suite 408,
Anchorage. Alaska 99501. (907) 265-5301.
Office of the Regional Solicitor, Department
of the Interior, Richard B. Russell Federal
Building. 75 Spring St.. SW.. Suite 1328.
Atlanta. Georgia 30303. (404) 221-4447.
Office of the Regional Solicitor. Department
of the Interior, c/o U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service. Suite 308,1 Gateway Center.
< Newton Comer. Massachusetts 02158, (617)
829-9258.
Office of the Field Solicitor, Department of
the Interior. 688 Federal Building. Fort
Snelling. Twin Cities. Minnesota 55111.
(012) 72S-3540.
Office of the Regional Solicitor. Department
of the Interior. P.O. Box 25007, Denver
Federal Canter, Denver. Colorado 80225.
(303) 234-3175.
Office of the Field Solicitor. Department of
the Interior. P.O. Box 549. Aberdeen, South
Dakota 57401. (605) 225-7254. .
Office of the Field Solicitor, Department of
the Interior. P.O. Box 1538, Billing!,
Montana 59103, (406) 245-6711.
Office of the Regional Solicitor. Department
of the Interior. Room E-2753,2800 Cottage*
Way. Sacramento, California 95825, (916)
484-4331.
Office of the Field Solicitor. Department of
the Interior. Valley Bank Center. Suite 280,
201 North Central Avenue, Phoenix,
Arizona 85073. (602) 261-4756.
Office of the Field Solicitor, Department of
the Interior. 3610 Central Avenue, Suite
104, Riverside. California 92508, (714) 7871560.
Office of the Field Solicitor. Department of
the Interior. Window Rock, Arizona 86518.
(002) 871-5151,
Office of the Regional Solicitor, Department
of the Interior. Room 3008. Page Belcher
Federal Building. Tulsa, Oklahoma 74101
(918) 581-7501.
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families or Indian tribes. Proceedings in
state courts involving the custody of
Indian children shall follow strict
procedures and meet stringent
requirements to justify any result in an
individual case contrary to these
preferences. The Indian Child Welfare
Act, the federal regulations
implementing the Act, the recommended
guidelines and any state statutes,
regulations or rules promulgated to
implement the Act shall be liberally
construed in favor of a result that is
consistent with these preferences. Any
ambiguities in any of such statutes,
regulations, rules or guidelines shall be
resolved in favor of the result that is
most consistent with these preferences.
(2) In any child custody proceeding
where applicable state or other federal
law provides a higher standard of
protection to the rights of the parent or
Indian custodian than the protection
accorded under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, the state court shall apply
the state or other federal law, provided
that application of that law does not
infringe any right accorded by the
Indian Child Welfare Act to an Indian
tribe or child.
A. Commentary
The purpose of this section is to apply
to the Indian Child Welfare Act the
canon of construction that remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed to
achieve their purpose. The three major
purposes are derived from a reading to
the Act itself. In order to fully implement
the Congressional intent the rule shall
be applied to all implementing rules and
state legislation as well.
Subsection A.(2) applies to canon of
statutory construction that specific
language shall be given precedence over
general -language. Congress has given
certain specific rights to tribes and
Indian children. For example, the tribe
has a right to intervene in involuntary
custody proceedings. The child has a
right to learn of tribal affiliation upon
becoming 18 years old. Congress did not
intend 25 U.S.C. 1921 to have the effect
af eliminating those rights where a court
:oncludes they are in derogation of a
parental right provided under a state
itatute. Congress intended for this
lection to apply primarily in those
nstances where a state provides greater
protection for a right accorded to
»arents under the Act. Examples of this
nclude State laws which: impose a
igher burden of proof than the Act for
"moving a child from a home, give the
arents more time to prepare after
jceiving notice, require more effective
otice, impose stricter emergency
•moval procedure requirements on
lose removing a child, give parents

greater access to documents, or contain
additional safeguard to assure the
voluntariness of consent.
B. Pretrial requirements
B.l. Determination That Child Is an
Indian
(a) When a state court has reason to
believe a child involved in a child
custody proceeding is an Indian, the
court shall seek verification of the
child's status from either the Bureau of
Indian Affairs or the child's tribe. In a
voluntary placement proceeding where a
consenting parent evidences a desire for
anonymity, the court shall make its
inquiry in a manner that will not cause
the parent's indentity to become
publicly known.
(b)(i) The determination by a tribe
that a child is or is not a member of that
tribe, is or is not eligible for membership
in that tribe, or that the biological parent
is or is not a member of that tribe is
conclusive.
(ii) Absent a contrary determination
by the tribe that is alleged to be the
Indian child's tribe, a determination by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs that a child
is or is not an Indian child is conclusive.
(c) Circumstances under which a state
court has reason to believe a child
involved in a child custody proceeding
is an Indian include but are not limited
to the following:
(i) Any party to the case, Indian tribe,
Indian organization or public or private
agency informs the court that the child is
an Indian child.
(ii) Any public or state-licensed
agency involved in child protection
services or family support has
discovered information which suggests
that the child is an Indian child
(iii) The child who is the subject of the
proceeding gives the court reason to
believe he or she is an Indian child
(iv) The residence or the domicile of
the child, his or her biological parents,
or the Indian custodian is known by the
court to be or is shown to be a
predominantly Indian community. <
(v) An officer of the court involved in
the proceeding has knowledge that the
child may be an Indian child
B.l. Commentary
This guideline makes clear that the
best source of information on whether a
particular child is Indian is the tribe
itself. It is the tribe's prerogative to
determine membership criteria and to
decide who meets those criteria. Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 133
(1942). Because of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs* long experience in determining
who is an Indian for a variety of
purposes, its determinations are also

entitled to great deference. &?#, e#t
United States v. Sandoval, 231, U.S. 2t»
17 (1913).
Although tribal verification is
preferred, a court may want to seek
verification from the BIA in those
voluntary placement cases where the
parent has requested anonymity and the
tribe does not have a system for keeping
child custody matters confidential.
Under the Act confidentially is given
a much higher priority in voluntary
proceedings than in involuntary ones.
The Act mandates a tribal right of notice
and intervention in involuntary
proceedings but not in voluntary ones.
Cf. 25 U.S.C § 1912 with 25 U.S.C
§ 1913. For voluntary placements,
however, the Act specifically directs
state courts to respect parental requests
for confidentiality. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c)
The most common voluntary placement
involves a newborn infant.
Confidentiality has traditionally been a
high priority in such placements. The
Act reflects that traditional approach by
requiring deference to requests for
anonymity in voluntary placements but
not in involuntary ones. This guideline
specifically provides that anonymity not
be compromised in seeking verification
of Indian status. If anonymity were
compromised at that point, the statutory
requirement that requests for anonymity
be respected in applying the preferences
would be meaningless.
Enrollment is not always required in
order to be a member of a tribe. Some
tribes do not have written rolls. Others
have rolls that list only persons that
were members as of a certain date.
Enrollment is the common evidentiary
means of establishing Indian status, but
it is not the only means nor is it
necessarily determinative. United States
v. Broncheau. 597 F.2d 126a 1203 (9th
Cir. 1979).
The guidelines also list several
circumstances which shall trigger an
inquiry by the court and petitioners to
determine whether a child is an Indian
for purposes of this Act This listing is
not intended to be complete, but it does
list the most common circumstances
giving rise to a reasonable belief that *
child may be an Indian.
B.2. Determination of Indian Child's
Tribe
(a) Where an Indian child is a member
of more than one tribe or is eligible for
membership in more than one tribe but
is not a member of any of them, the
court is called upon to determine with
which tribe the child has more
significant contacts.
(b) The court shall send the notice
specified in recommended guideline R4»
to each such tribe. The notice shall
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specify the other tribe or tribes that are
boing considered as the child's tribe and
invite each tribe's views on which tribe
shall be so designated.
(i) In determining which tribe shall be
designated the Indian child's tribe, the
court shall consider, among other things.
the following factors:
(i) length ofresidenceon or near the
i eservation of each tribe and frequency
of contacts with each tribe;
(i:j child's participation in activities of
t»ach tribe:
(iii) child's fluency in the language of
tr;u:h tribe:
(iv) whether there has been a previous
KIjudication with respect to the child by
• ?:ourt of one of the tribes:
(v) residence on or near one of the
tribes'reservationby the child's
datives:
(vij tribal membership of custodial
parent or Indian custodian:
(vi) interest asserted by each tribe in
»?spcnse to the notice specified in
subsection B.2.(b) of these guidelines;
md
(viii) the child's self identification.
(d) The court's determination together
vvith the reasons for it shall be set out in
! written document and made a part of
he record of. the proceeding. A copy of
'at document shall be sent to each
•jrty \o the proceeding and to each
orson or governmental agency that
oeived notice of the proceeding.
(e) If the child is a member of only one
! be. that tribe shall be designated the
uiiun child's tribe even though the
hi Id is eligible for membership in
mother tribe. If a child becomes a
member of one tribe during or after the
roceeding. that tribe shall be
!es:gnated as the Indian child's tribe
\ ith respect to all subsequent actions
elated to the proceeding. If the child
> comes a member of a tribe other than
\o. one designated by the court as the
idian child's tribe, actions taken based
'\ the court's determination prior to the
uid's becoming a tribal member
mtinue to be valid.
2. Commentary
This guideline requires the court to
"tify all tribes that are potentially the
.dian child's tribe so that each tribe
ay assert its claim to that status and
e court may have the benefit of the
i'ws of each tribe. Notification of all
* tribes is also necessary so the court
i consider the comparative interest of
ch tribe in the child's welfare in
king its decision. That factor has long
n regarded an important
isideration In making child custody
is ions,
he significant factors listed in this
tion are based on recommendations

by tribal officials Involved in child
welfare matters. The Act itself and the
legislative history make it clear that
tribalrightsare to be based on the
existence of a political relationship
between the family and the tribe. For
that reason, the guidelines make actual
tribal membership of the child
conclusive on this issue.
The guidelines do provide, however,
that previous decisions of a court made
on its own determination of the Indian
child's tribe are not invalidated simply
because the child becomes a member of
a different tribe. This*provision is
included because of the importance of
stability and continuity to a child who
has been placed outside the home by a
court If a child becomes a member
before a placement is made or before a
change of placement becomes necessary
for other reasons, however, then that
membership decision can be taken into
account without harm to the child's need
for stable relationships.
We have received several
recommendations that "Indian child's
tribe" status be accorded to all tribes in
which a child is eligible for membership.
The fact that Congress, in the definition
of "Indian child's tribe," provided a
criterion for determining which is the
Indian child's tribe, is a clear indication
of legislative intent that there be only
one such tribe for each child. For
purposes of transfer of jurisdiction, there
obviously can be only one tribe to
adjudicate the case. To give more than
one tribe "Indian child's tribe" status for
purposes of the placement preferences
would dilute the preference accorded by
Congress to the tribe with which the
child has the more significant contacts.
A right of intervention could be
accorded a tribe with which a child has
less significant contacts without
undermining therightof the other tribe.
A state court can* if it wishes and state
law permits, permit intervention by
more than one tribe. It could also give s
second tribe preference in placement
after attempts to place t child with s
member of the first tribe or in a home or
institution designated by the first tribe
had proved unsuccessful. So long as the
special rights of the Indian child's tribe
are respected, giving special status to
the tribe with the less significant
contacts is not prohibited by the Act
and may, in many instances, be a good
way to comply with the spirit of the Act
Determinations of the Indian child's
tribe for purposes of this Act shall not
serve as any precedent for other
situations. The standards in this statute
and these guidelines are designed with
child custody matters in mind. A
different determination may be entirely
appropriate In other legal contexts.
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B.3. Determination That Placement Is
Covered by the Act
(a) Although most juvenile
delinquency proceedings are not
covered by the Act. the Act does apply *
to status offenses. 6uch as truancy and
incorrigibility, which can only be
committed by children, and to any
juvenile delinquency proceeding that
results in the termination of a parental
relationship.
(b) Child custody disputes arising in
the context of divorce or separation
proceedings or similar domestic
relations proceedings are not covered by
the Act so long as custody is awarded to
one of the parents.
(c) Voluntary placements which do
not operate to prohibit the child's parent
or Indian custodian from regaining
custody of the child at any time are not
not covered by the Act Where such
placements are made pursuant to a
written agreement that agreement shall
state explicitly therightof the parent or
custodian to regain custody of the child
upon demand.
B.3. Commentary
The purpose of this section is to deal
with some of the questions the
Department has been receiving
concerning the coverage of the Act
The entire legislative history makes it
clear that the Act is directed primarily
at attempts to place someone other than
the parent or Indian custodian in charge
of raising an Indian child—whether on a
permanent or temporary basis. Although
there is some overlap, juvenile
delinquency proceedings are primarily
designed for other purposes. Where the
child is taken out of the home for
committing a crime it is usually to
protect society from further offenses by
the child and to punish the child in order
to persuade that child and others not to
commit other offenses.
Placements based on status offenses
(actions that are not a crime when
committed by an adult), however, are
usually premised on the conclusion that
the present custodian of the child is not
providing adequate care or supervision.
To the extent that a status offense poses
any immediate danger to society, it is
usually also punishable as an offense
which would be a crime if committed by
an adult For that reason status offenses
are treated the same as dependency
proceedings and are covered by the Act
and these guidelines, while other
juvenile delinquency placements are
excluded
While the Act excludes placements
based on an act which would be a crime
if committed by an adult, it does cover
terminations of parental rights even
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where they are based on an act which
would be a crime if committed by an
adult. Such terminations are not
intended as punishment and do not
prevent the child from committing
further offenses. They are based on the
conclusion that someone other than the
present custodian of the child should be
raising the child. Congress has
concluded that courts shall make such
judgments only on the basis of evidence
that serious physical or emotional harm
to the child is likely to result unless the
child is removed.
The Act excludes from coverage an
award of custody to one of the parents
"in a divorce proceeding." If construed
narrowly, this provision would leave
custody awards resulting from
proceedings between husband and wife
for separate maintenance, but not for
dissolution of the marriage bond within
the coverage of the Act. Such a narrow
interpretation would not be in accord
with the intent of Congress. The
legislative history indicates that the
exemption for divorce proceedings, in
part, was included in response to the
views of this Department that the
protections provided by this Act are not
needed in proceedings between parents.
In terms of the purposes of this Act,
there is no reason to treat separate
maintenance or similar domestic
relations proceedings differently from
divorce proceedings. For that reason the
statutory term "divorce proceeding'* is
construed to include other domestic
relations proceedings between spouses.
The Act also excludes from its
coverage any placements that do not
deprive the parents or Indian custodians
of therightto regain custody of the child
upon demand. Without this exception a
court appearance would be required
every time an Indian child left home to
go to school Court appearances would
also be required for many informal
caretaking arrangements that Indian
parents and custodians sometimes make
'or their children. This statutory
exemption is restated here in the hope
hat it will reduce the instances in which
ndian parents are unnecessarily
nconvenienced by being required to
;ive consent in court to such informal
rrangements.
Some private groups and some states
nter into formal written agreements
tith parents for temporary custody [See
,g. Alaska Statutes J 47.10.230). The
iiidelines recommend that the parties to
ich agreements explicitly provide for
turn of the child upon demand if they
? not wish the Act to apply to such
acements. Inclusion of such a
ovision is advisable because courts
squently assume that when an

agreement is reduced to writing, the
parties have only those rights
specifically written into the agreement.
B.4. Determination of Jurisdiction
(a) In any Indian child custody
proceeding in state court, the court shall
determine the residence and domicile of
the child. Except as provided in Section
B.7. of these guidelines, if either the
residence or domicile is on a reservation
where the tribe exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings, the proceedings in state
court shall be dismissed.
(b) If the Indian child has previously
resided or been domiciled on the
reservation, the state court shall contact
the tribal court to determine whether the
child is a ward of the tribal court.
Except as provided in Section B.7. of
these guidelines, if the child is a ward of
a tribal court, the state court
proceedings shall be dismissed
B.4. Commentary
The purpose of this section is to
remind the state court of the need to
determine whether it has jurisdiction
under the Act. The action is dismissed
as soon as it is determined that the court
lacks jurisdiction except in emergency
situations. The procedures for
emergency situations are set out in
Section B.7.
B.5. Notice Requirements
(a) In any involuntary child custody
proceeding, the state court shall make
inquiries to determine if the child
involved is a member of an Indian tribe
or if a parent of the child is a member of
an Indian tribe and the child is eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe.
(b) In any involuntary Indian child
custody proceeding, notice of the
proceeding shall be sent to the parents
and Indian custodians, if any, and to
any tribes that may be the Indian child's
tribe by registered mail with return
receipt requested The notice shall be
written in clear and understandable
language and include the following information:
(i) The name of the Indian child
(ii) His or her tribal affiliation.
(iii) A copy of the petition, complaint
or other document by which the
proceeding was initiated
(iv) The name of the petitioner and the
name and address of the petitioner's
attorney.
(v) A statement of the right of the
biological parents or Indian custodians
and the Indian child's tribe to intervene
in the proceeding.
(vi) A statement that if the parents or
Indian custodians are unable to afford

counsel, counsel will be appointed to
represent them.
(vii) A statement of therightof the
natural parents or Indian custodians and
the Indian child's tribe to have, on
request, twenty days (or such additional
time as may be permitted under state
law) to prepare for the proceedings.
(viii) The location, mailing address
and telephone number of the court
(ix) A statement of therightof the
parents or Indian custodians or the
Indian child's tribe to petition the court
to transfer the proceeding to the Indian
child's tribal court
(x) The potential legal consequences
of an adjudication on future custodial
rights of the parents or Indian
custodians.
(xi) A statement in the notice to the
tribe that since child custody
proceedings are usually conducted on a
confidential basis, tribal officials should
keep confidential the information
contained in the notice concerning the
particular proceeding and not reveal it
to anyone who does not need the
information in order to exercise the
tribe'srightunder the Act
(c) The tribe, parents or Indian
custodians receiving notice from the
petitioner of the pendency of a child
custody proceeding has therightupon
request, to be granted twenty days (or
such additional time as may be
permitted under state law) from the date
upon which the notice was received to
prepare for the proceeding.
(d) The original or a copy of each
notice sent pursuant to this section shall
be filed with the court together with any
return receipts or other proof of service.
9e) Notice may be personnally served
on any person entitled to receive notice
in lieu of mail service.
(f) If a parent or Indian custodian
appears in court without an attorney,
the court shall inform him or her of the
right to appointed counsel the right to
request that the proceeding be
transferred to tribal court or to object to
such transfer, therightto request
additional time to prepare for the
proceeding and the right (if the parent or
Indian custodian is not already a party)
to intervene in the proceedings.
(g) If the court or a petitioniing party
has reason to believe that a parent or
Indian custodian is not likely to
understand the contents of the notice
because of lack of adequate
comprehension of written English, a
copy of the notice shall be sent to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs agency nearest
to the residence of that person
requesting that Bureau of Indian Affairs
personnel arrange to have the notice
explained to that person in the language
that he or she best understands.
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8.5. Commentary
This section recommends that state
courts routinely inquire of participants
in child custody proceedings whether
the child is an Indian. If anyone asserts
that the child is an Indian or that there
is reason to believe the child may be an
Indian, then the court shall contact the
tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs for
verification. Refer to sections B.l and
B.2 of these guidelines.
This section specifies the information
to be contained in the notice. This
information is necessary so the persons
who receive notice will be able to
exercise theirrightsin a timely manner.
Subparagraph (xi) provides that tribes
hall be requested to assist in
maintaining the confidentiality of the
proceeding. Confidentiality may be
difficult to maintain—especially where
small tribes are involved and the
'ikelihood that the family involved is
well known by tribal officials is great.
Although Congress was concerned with
•onfidentiality, it concluded that the
nterest of tribes in the welfare of their
children justified taking some risks with
onfidentiality—especially in
i voluntary proceedings. It is
-asonable, however, to ask tribal
'icials to maintain as much
•/J?fidentialityas possible consistent
vith the exercise of tribalrightsunder
r
'>.c Act.
The time limits are minimum ones
•quired by the Act. In many instances,
ore time may be available under state
ourt procedures or because of the
rcumstances of the particular case.
in such instances, the notice shall
ate that additional time is available.
The Act requires notice to the parent
" Indian custodian. At a minimum,
irents must be notified if termination
parental rights is a potential outcome
ace it is their relationship to the child
hat is at stake. Similarly, the Indian
stodians must be notified of any
.tion that could lead to the custodians'
sing custody of the child. Even where
nly custody is an issue, noncustodial
arents clearly have a legitimate
\terest in the matter. Although notice to
jth parents and Indian custodians may
ot be required in all instances by the
xt or the Fourteenth Amendment to the
1
S. Constitution, providing notice to
oth is in keeping with the spirit of the
rx For that reason, these guidelines
commend notice be sent to both.
Subsection (d) requiresfilingthe
tice with the court so there will be a
jmplete record of efforts to comply
;th the Act
Subsection (e) authorizes personal
rvices since it is superior to mail
rvices and provides greater protection

or rights as authorized by 25 U.S.C 1921.
Since serving the notice does not
involve any assertion of jurisdiction
over the person served, personal notice
may be served without regard to state or
reservation boundaries.
Subsections (f) and (g) provide
procedures to increase the likelihood
that rights are understood by parents
and Indian custodians.
B.6. Time Limits and Extensions
(a) A tribe, parent or Indian custodian
entitled to notice of the pendency of a
child custody proceeding has a right,
upon request, to be granted an
additional twenty days from the date
upon which notice was received to
prepare for participation in the
proceeding.
(b) The proceeding may not begin
until all of the following dates have
passed:
(i) ten days after the parent or Indian
custodian (or Secretary where the
parent or Indian custodian is unknown
to the petitioner) has received notice;
(ii) ten days after the Indian child's
tribe (or the Secretary if the Indian
child's tribe is unknown to the
petitioner) has received notice;
(iii) thirty days after the parent or
Indian custodian has received notice if
the parent or Indian custodian has
requested an additional twenty days to
prepare for the proceeding; and
(iv) Thirty days after the Indian
child's tribe has received notice if the
Indian child's tribe has requested an
additional twenty days to prepare for
the proceeding.
(c) The time limits listed in this
section are the minimum time periods
required by the Act The court may grant
more more time to prepare where state
law permits,
B.8. Commentary
This section attempts to clarify the
waiting periods required by the Act
after notice has been received of an
involuntary Indian child custody
proceeding. Two Independent rights are
involved-—the right of the parents or
Indian custodians and the right of the
Indian child's tribe. The proceeding may
not begin until the waiting periods to
which both are entided have passed.
This section also makes clear that
additional extensions of time may be
granted beyond the minimum required
by the Act
B.7. Emergency Removal of an Indian
Child
(a) Whenever an Indian child is
removed from the physical custody of
the child's parents or Indian custodians
pursuant to the emergency removal or
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custody provisions of state law, the
agency responsible for the removal
action shall immediately cause an
inquiry to be made as to the residence
and domicile of the child.
(b) When a court order authorizing
continued emergency physical custody
is sought, the petition for that order shall
be accompanied by an affidavit
containing the following information:
(i) The name, age and last known
address of the Indian child.
(ii) The name and address of the
child's parents and Indian* custodians, if
any. If 3uch persons are unknown, a
detailed explanation of what efforts
have been made to locate them shall be
included.
(iii) Facts necessary to determine the
residence and the domicile of the Indian
child and whether either the residence
or domicile is on an Indian reservation.
If either the residence or domicile is
believed to be on an Indian reservation,
the name of the reservation shall be
stated.
(iv) The tribal affiliation of the child
and of the parents and/or Indian
custodians.
(v) A specific and detailed account of
the circumstances that lead the agency
responsible for the emergency removal
of the child to take that action.
(vi) If the child is believed to reside or
be domiciled on a reservation where the
tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over child custody matters, a statement
of efforts that have been made and are
being made to transfer the child to the
tribe's jurisdiction.
(vii) A statement of the specific
actions that have been taken to assist
the parents or Indian custodians so the
child may safely be returned to their
custody.
(c) 11 the Indian child is not restored to
the parents or Indian custodians or
jurisdiction is not transferred to the
tribe, the agency responsible for the
child's removal must promptly
commence a state court proceeding for
foster care placement If the child
resides or is domiciled on a reservation
where the tribe exercise* exclusive
jurisdiction over child custody matters,
such placement must terminate as soon
as the imminent physical damage or
harm to the child which resulted in the
emergency removal no longer exists or
as soon as the tribe exercises
jurisdiction over the case—whichever is
earlier.
(d) Absent extraordinary
circumstances, temporary emergency
custody shall not be continued for more
than 90 days without a determination by
the court supported by clear and
convincing evidence and the testimony
of at least one qualified expert witness*
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that custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to
the child.
B.7. Commentary
Since jurisdiction under the Act is
based on domicile and residence rather
than simple physical presence, there
may be instances in which action must
be taken with respect to a child who is
physically located off a reservation but
is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction,
In such instances the tribe will usually
not be able to take swift action to
exercise its jurisdiction. For that reason
Congress authorized states to take
temporary emergency action.
Since emergency action must be taken
without the careful advance deliberation
normally required, procedures must be
established to assure that the emergency
actions are quickly subjected to review.
This section provides procedures for
prompt review of such emergency
actions. It presumes the state already
has such review procedures and only
prescribes additional procedures that
shall be followed in cases involving
Indian children.
The legislative history clearly states
that placements under such emergency
procedures are to be as short as
possible. If the emergency ends, the
placement shall end. State action shall
also end as soon as the tribe is ready to
take over the case.
Subsection (d) refers primarily to the
period between when the petition is
filed and when the trial court renders its
decision. The Act requires that, except
for emergencies, Indian children are not
to be removed from their parents unless
a court finds clear and convincing
evidence that the child would be in
serious danger unless removed from the
home. Unless there is some kind of time
limit on the length of an "emergency
removal" (that is, any removal not made
pursuant to a finding by the court that
there is clear and convincing evidence
that continued parental custody would
make serious physical or emotional
harm likely), the safeguards of the Act
could be evaded by use of long-term
emergency removals.
Subsection (d) recommends what is,
in effect, a speedy trial requirement The
court shall be required to comply with
the requirements of the Act and reach a
decision within 90 days unless there are
"extraordinary circumstances" that
make additional delay unavoidable.
B.8. Improper Removal From Custody
(a) If, in the course of any Indian child
custody proceeding, the court has
reason to believe that the child who Is
the subject of the proceeding may have

been improperly removed from the
custody of his or her parent or Indian
custodian or that the child has been
improperly retained after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of custody,
and that the petitioner is responsible for
such removal or retention, the court
shall immediately stay the proceedings
until a determination can be made on
the question of improper removal or
retention.
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner
is responsible for an improper removal
or retention, the child shall be
immediately returned to his or her
parents or Indian custodian.
B.8. Commentary
This section is designed to implement
25 U.S.C § 1920. Since afindingof
improper removal goes to the
jurisdiction of the court to hear the case
at all, this section provides that the
court will decide the issue as soon as it
arises before proceeding further on the
merits.
C. Requests for Transfer to Tribal Court
CI. Petitions under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)
for transfer of proceeding
Either parent, the Indian custodian or
the Indian child's tribe may, orally or in
writing, request the court to transfer the
Indian child custody proceeding to the
tribal court of the child's tribe. The
request shall be made promptly after
receiving notice of the proceeding. If the
request is made orallyit shall be
reduced to writing by the court and
made a part of the record.
Cl. Commentary
Reference is made to 25 U.S.C 1911(b)
in the title of this section in order to
clarify that this section deals only with
transfers where the child is not
domiciled or residing on an Indian
reservation.
So that transfers can occur as quickly
and simply as possible, requests can be
made orally.
This section specifies that requests
are to be made promptly after receiving
notice of the proceeding. This is a
modification of the timeliness
requirement that appears in the earlier
version of the guidelines. Although the
statute permits proceedings to be
commenced even before actual notice is
received by parties entided to notice,
those parties do not lose theirrightto
request a transfer simply because
neither the petitioner nor the Secretary
was able to locate them earlier.
Permitting late transfer requests by
persons and tribes who were notified
late may cause some disruption. It will
also, however, provide an incentive to

the petitioners to make a diligent effort
to give notice promptly in order to avoid
such disruptions.
The Department received a number of
comments objecting to any timeliness
requirement at alL Commenters pointed
out that the statute does not explicitly
require transfer requests to be timely.
Some commenters argued that imposing
such a requirement violated tribal and
parentalrightsto intervene at any point
in the proceedings under 25 U.S.C
S 1911(c) of the Act.
While the Act permits intervention at
any point in the proceeding, it does not
explicitly authorize transfer requests at
any time. Late interventions do not have
nearly the disruptive effect on the
proceeding that last minute transfers do
A case that is almost completed does
not need to be retried when intervention
is permitted. The problems resulting
from late intervention are primarily
those of the intervenor, who has lost the
opportunity to influence the portion of
the proceedings that was completed
prior to intervention.
Although the Act does not explicitly
require transfer petitions to be timely, it
does authorize the court to refuse to
transfer a case for good cause. When a
party who could have petitioned earlier
waits until the case is almost complete
to ask that it be transferred to another
court and retried, good cause exists to
deny the request
Timeliness is a proven weapon of the
courts against disruption caused by
negligence or obstructionist tactics on
the part of counsel. If a transfer petition
must be honored at any point before
judgment a party could wait to see how
the trial is going in state court and then
obtain another trial if it appears the
other side will win. Delaying a transfer
request could be used as a tactic to wear
down the other side by requiring the
case to be tried twice. The Act was not
intended to authorize such tactics and
the "good cause" provision is ample
authority for the court to prevent them.
C2. Criteria and Procedures for Ruling
on 25 U.S.C 11911(b) Transfer Petitions
(a) Upon receipt of a petition to*
transfer by a parent Indian custodian or
the Indian child's tribe, the court must
transfer unless either parent objects to
such transfer, the tribal court declines
jurisdiction, or the court determines that
good cause to the contrary exists for
denying the transfer.
(b) If the court believes or any party
asserts that good cause to the contrary
exists, the reasons for such belief or
assertion shall be stated in writing and
made available to the parties who are
petitioning for transfer. The petitioners
shall have the opportunity to provide the
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court with their views on whether or not
good cause to deny transfer exists, C.2.
Commentary
Subsection (a) simply states the rule
provided in 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
Since the Act gives the parents and
the tribal court of the Indian'child*s tribe
an absolute veto over transfers, there is
no need for any adversary proceedings
if the parents or the tribal court opposes
transfer. Where it is proposed to deny
transfer on the grounds of "good cause."
however, all parties need an opportunity
to present their views to the court.
C.3. Determination of Good Cause to the
Contrary
(a) Good cause not to transfer the
proceeding exists if the Indian child's
tribe does not have a tribal court as
defined by the Act to which the case can
be transferred
(b) Good cause not to transfer the
proceeding may exist if any of the
following circumstances exists:
(i) The proceeding was at an
advanced stage when the petition to
transfer was received and the petitioner
did not fie the petition promptly after
receiving notice of the hearing.
(ii) The Indian child is over twelve
years of age and objects to the transfer.
(iii) The evidence necessary to decide
the case could not be adequately
presented in the tribal court without
undue hardship to the parties or the
witnesses.
(iv) The parents of a child over five
years of age are not available and the
child has had little or no contact with
the child's tribe or members of the
child's tribe.
(c) Socio-economic conditions and the
perceived adequacy of tribal or Bureau
of Indian Affairs social services or
judicial systems may not be considered
in a determination that good cause
exists.
(d) The burden of establishing good
cause to the contrary shall be on the
party opposing the transfer.
C.3. Commentary
All five criteria that were listed in the
earlier version of the guidelines were
highly controversial Comments on the
first two criteria were almost
unanimously negative. Thefirstcriterion
was whether the parents were still
living. The second was whether an
Indian custodian or guardian for the
child had been appointed. These criteria
were criticized as irrelevant and
arbitrary. It was argued that children
who are orphans or have no appointed
Indian custodian or guradian are no
"lore nor less in need of the Act's
protections that other children. It was
also pointed out that these criteria are

contrary to the decision in Wisconsin
Potawctomies of the Hannahville Indidh
Community v. Houston, 397 F. Supp. 719
(W.D. Mich 1973). which was explicitly
endorsed by the committee that drafted
that Act The court in that case found
that tribal jurisdiction existed even
through the children involved were
orphans for whom no guardian had been
appointed.
Although there was some support for
the third and fourth criteria, the
preponderance of the comment
concerning them was critical. The third
criteria was whether the child had little
or no contact with his or her Indian tribe
for a significant period of time. The
fourth was whether the child had ever
resided on the reservation for a
significant period of time. These criteria
were criticized, in part because they
would virtually excludefromtransfers
infants who were born off the
reservation. Many argued that the tribe
has a legitimate interest in the welfare
of members who have not had
significant previous contact with the
tribe or the reservation. Some also
argued that these criteria invited the
state courts to be making the kind of
cultural decisons that the Act
contemplated should be made by tribes.
Some argued that the use of vague
words in these criteria accorded state
courts too much discretion.
Thefifthcriteria was whether a child
over the age of twelve objected to the
transfer. Comment on this criteria was
much more evenly divided and many of
the critics were ambivalent They
worried that young teenagers could be
too easily influenced by the judge or by
social workers. They also argued that
fear of the unknow would cuase many
teenagers to make an ill-considered
decision against transfer.
Thefirstfour criteria in the earlier
version were all directed toward the
question of whether the child's
connections with the reservation were
so tenuous that transfer back to the tribe
is not advised The circumstances under
which it may be proper for the state
court to take such considerations into
account are set out in the revisedsubsection (iv).
It is recommended that in most cases
state court judges not be called upon to
determined whether or not a child's
contacts with a reservation are so
limited that a case should not be
transferred. This may be a valid
consideration since the shock of
changing cultures may, in some cases,
be harmful to the child This
determination, however, can be made by
the parent who has a veto over transfer
to tribal court
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This reasoning does not apply,
however, where there is no parent
available to make that decision. The
guidelines recommend that state courts
be authorized to make such
determinations only in those cases
where there is no parent available to
make it
State court authority to make such
decisions is limited to those cases where
the child is over five years of age. Most
children younger than five years can be
expected to adjust more readily to a
change in cultural environment
Thefifthcriterion has been retained
It is true that teenagers may make some
unwise decisions, but it is also true that
their judgment has developed to the
extent that their views ought to be taken
into account in making decisions about
their lives.
The existence of a tribal court is made
an absolute requirement for transfer of a
case. Clearly, the absence of a tribal
court is good cause not to ask the tribe
to try the case.
Consideration of whether or not the
case can be properly tried in tribal court
without hardship to the parties or
witnesses was included on the strength
of the section-by-section analysis in the
House Report on the Act which stated
with respect to the § 1911(b), 'The
subsection is intended to permit a State
court to apply to apply a modified
doctrine of forum non conveniens, in
appropriate cases, to insure that the
rights of the child as an Indian, the
Indian parents or custodian, and the
tribe are fully protected" Where a child
is in fact living in a dangerous situation,
he or she should not be forced to remain
there simply because the witnesses
cannot afford to travel long distances to
court
Application of this criterion will tend
to limit transfers to cases involving
Indian children who do not live very far
from the reservation. This problem may
be alleviated in some instances by
having the court come to the witnesses.
The Department is aware of one case
under that Act where transfer was
conditioned on having the tribal court
meet in the city where the family lived
Some cities hav substantial populations
of members of tribes from distant
reservations. In such situations some
tribes may wish to appoint members
who live in those cities as tribal judges.
The timeliness of the petition for
transfer, discussed at length in the
commentary to section Cl, is listed as a
factor to be considered Inclusion of this
criterion is designed to encourage the
prompt exercise of therightto petition
for transfer in order to avoid
unnecessary delays. Long periods of
uncertainty concerning the future are
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generally regarded as harmful to the
well-being of children. For that reason* it
is especially important to avoid
unnecessary delays in child custody
proceedings.
Almost all commenters favored
retention of the paragraph stating that
reservation socio-economic conditions
and the perceived adequacy of tribal
institutions are not to be taken into
account in making good cause
determinations. Some commenters did
suggest however, that a case not be
transferred if it is clear that a particular
disposition of the case that could only
be made by the state court held
especially great promise of benefiting
the child.
Such considerations are important but
they have not been listed because the
Department believes such judgments are
best made by tribal courts. Parties who
believe that state court adjudication
would be better for such reasons can
present their reasons to the tribal court
and urge it to decline jurisdiction. The
Department is aware of one case under
the Act where this approach is being
used and believes it is more in keeping
with the confidence Congress has
expressed in tribal courts.
Since Congress has established a
policy of preferring tribal control over
custody decisions affecting tribal
members, the burden of proving that an
exception to that policy ought to be
made in a particular case rests on the
party urging that an exception be made.
This rule is reflected in subsection (d).

C.4. Commentary
The previous version of this section
provided that the state court should
presume the tribal court has declined to
acenpt jurisdiction unless it hears
otherwise. The comments on this issue
were divided. This section has been
revised to require the tribal court to
decline the transfer affirmatively if it
docs not wish to take the case. This
approach is in keeping with the
apparent intent of Congress. The
language in the Act providing that
transfers are "subject to declination by
the tribal court" indicates that
affirmative action by the tribal court fs
required to decline a transfer.
The recommended time limit for a
decision has been extended from ten to
twenty days. The additional time is
needed for the court to become apprised
of factors it may want to consider in
determining whether or not to decline
the transfer.
A new paragraph has been added
recommending that the parties assist the
tribal court in making its decision on
declination by giving the tribal court
their views on the matter.
Transfers ought to be arranged as
simply as possible consistent with due
process. Transfer procedures are a good
subject for tribal-state agreements under
25 CJ.S.C. § 1919.
D. Adjudication of Involuntary
Placements, Adoptions* or Terminations
or Terminations of Parental Rights
D.l. Access to Reports
Each party to a foster care placement
C.4. Tribal Court Declination of Transfer or termination of parental rights
proceeding under State law involving an
(a) A tribal court to which transfer is
Indian child has therightto examine all
requested may decline to accept such
reports or other documents filed with
transfer.
the court upon which any decision with
respect to such action may be based. No
(b) Upon receipt of a transfer petition
decision of the court shall be based on
he state court shall notify the tribal
:ourt in writing of the proposed transfer, any report or other document not filed
with the court
rhe notice shall state how long the
ribal court has to make its decision. The D.l* Commentary
ribal court shall have at least twenty
Thefirstsentence merely restates the
aysfromthe receipt of notice of a
statutory
language verbatim. The second
roposed transfer to decide whether to
sentence makes explicit the implicit
ecline the transfer. The tribal court
assumption of Congress—that the court
tay inform the state court of its
will limit its considerations to those
ecision to decline either orally or in
documents
and reports that have been
ritfng.
filed with the court
(c) Parties shall file with the tribal
>urt any arguments they wish to make D.2. Efforts To Alleviate Need To
ther for or against tribal declination of Remove Child From Parents or Indian
Custodians
ansfer. Such arguments shall be made
ally in open court or in written
Any party petitioning a state court for
eadings that are served on all other
foster care placement or termination of
rties.
parentalrightsto an Indian child must
demonstrate to the court that prior to the
(d) If the case is transferred the state
commencement of the proceeding active
urt shall provide the tribal court with
efforts have been made to alleviate the
available information on the case.

need to remove the Indian child from his
or her parents or Indian custodians.
These efforts shall take into account the
prevailing social and cultural conditions
and way of life of the Indian child's
tribe. They shall also involve and use
the available resources of the extended
family, the tribe, Indian social service
agencies and individual Indian care
givers.
DJL Commentary
This section elaborates on the
meaning of "breakup of the Indian
family" as used in the Act. "Family
breakup" is sometimes used as a
synonym for divorce. In the context of
this statute, however, it is clear that
Congress meant a situation in which the
family is unable or unwilling to raise the
child in a manner that is not likely to
endanger the child's emotional or
physical health.
This section also recommends that the
petitioner take into account the culture
of the Indian child's tribe and use the
resources of the child's extended family
and tribe in attempting to help the
family function successfully as a home
for the child. The term "individual
Indian care givers" refers to medicine
men and other individual tribal
members who may have developed
special skills that can be used to help
the child's family succeed.
One commenter recommended that
detailed procedures and criteria be
established in order to determine
whether family support efforts had been
adequate. Establishing such procedures
and requirements would involve the
court in second-guessing the
professional judgment of social service
agencies. The Act does not comtemplate
such a role for the courts and they
generally lack the expertise to make
such judgments.
D.3. Standards of Evidence
(a) The court may not issue an order
effecting a foster care placement of an
Indian child unless clear and convincing
evidence is presented including the
testimony of one of more qualified
expert witnesses, demonstrating that the
child's continued custody with the
child's parents of Indian custodian fs
likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.
(b) The court may not order a
termination of parentalrightsunless die
court's order is supported by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt including
the testimony of one or more qualified
expert witnesses, that continued
custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to
the child
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(c) Evidence that only shows the
existence of community or family
poverty, crowded or inadequate
lousing, alcohol abuse, or noninforming social behavior does not
constitute clear and convincing evidence
hat continued custody is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child. To be clear and convincing.
the evidence must show the existence of
particular conditions in the home that
are likely to result in serious emotional
or physical damage to the particular
child who is the subject of the
proceeding. The evidence must show the
causal relationship between the
conditions that exist and the damage
that is likely to result
D.3. Commentary
Thefirsttwo paragraphs are
essentially restatement of the statutory
language. By imposing these standards.
Congress has changed the rules of law
of many states with respect to the
placement of Indian children. A child
may not be removed simply because
there is someone else willing to raise the
child who is likely to do a better job or
that it would be "in the best interests of
the child'* for him or her to live with
someone else. Neither can a placement
or termination of parentalrightsbe
ordered simply based on a
determination that the parents or
custodians are "unfit parents." It must
be shown that it is shown that it is
dangerous for the child to remain with
his or her present custodians. Evidence
of that must be "clear and convincing"
for placements and "beyond a
reasonable doubt" for terminations.
The legislative history of the Act
makes it pervasively clear that Congress
attributes many unwarranted removals
of Indian children to cultural bias on the
part of the courts and social workers
making the decisions. In many cases
children were removed merely because
the family did not conform to the
decision-maker's stereotype of what a
proper family should be-without any
testing of the implicit assumption that
only a family that conformed to that
stereotype could successfully raise
children. Subsection (c) makes it clear
that mere non-conformance with such
stereotypes or the existence of other
behavior or conditions that are
considered bad does not justify a
placement or termination under the
standards imposed by Congress. The
focus must be on whether the particular
conditions are likely to cause serious
damage.
D.4. Qualified Expert Witnesses
(a) Removal of an Indian child from
his or her family must be based on
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concerning the customs and cultures of
competent testimony from one or more
experts qualified to speak specifically to the tribes they serve. Their assistance is
the issue of whether continued custody
available in helping to locate such
by the parents or Indian custodians is
witnesses.
likely to result in serious physical or
£ Voluntary Proceedings
emotional damage to the child.
(b) Persons with the following
El. Execution of Consent
characteristics are most likely to meet
To be valid, consent to a voluntary,
the requirements for a qualified expert
termination
of parental rights or
witness for purposes of Indian child
adoption must be executed in writing
custody proceedings:
and recorded before a judge or
(i) A member of the Indian child's
magistrate
of a court of competent
tribe who is recognized by the tribal
jurisdiction.
A certificate of the court
community as knowledgeable in tribal
must
accompany
any consent and must
customs as they pertain to family
certify that the terms and consequences
organization and childrearing practices.
of the consent were explained in detail
(ii) A lay expert witness having
substantial experience in the delivery of and in the language of the parent or
child and family services to Indians, and Indian custodian, if English is not the
extensive knowledge of prevailing social primary language, and were fully
understood by the parent or Indian
and cultural standards and childrearing
custodian. Execution of consent need
practices within the Indian child's tribe.
not be in open court where
(iii) A professional person having
substantial education and experience in confidentiality is requested or indicated.
the area of his or her specialty.
E.1. Commentary
(c) The court or any party may request
This section provides that consent
the assistance of the Indian child's tribe
may
be executed before either a judge or
or the Bureau of Indian Affairs agency
magistrate. The addition of magistrates
serving the Indian child's tribe in
was made in response to a suggestion
locating persons qualified to serve as
from Alaska where magistrates are
expert witnesses.
found in most small communities but
D.4 Commentary
"judges" are more widely scattered. The
term "judge" as used in the statute is not
Thefirstsubsection is intended to
a term of art and can certainly be
point out that the issue on which
construed to include judicial officers
qualified expert testimony is required is
who are called magistrates in some
the question of whether or not serious
states. The statement that consent need
damage to the child is likely to occur if
not be in open court where
the child is not removed. Basically two
confidentiality is desired or indicated
questions are involved. First, is it likely
was taken directly from the House
that the conduct of the parents will
Report on the Act A recommendation
result in serious physical or emotional
that the guideline list the consequences
harm to the child? Second, if such
conduct will likely cause such harm, can of consent that must be described to the
the parents be persuaded to modify their parent or custodian has not been
adopted because the consequences can
conduct?
vary widely depending on the nature of
The party presenting an expert
the proceeding, state law and the
witness must demonstrate that the
particular facts of individual cases.
witness is qualified by reason of
educational background and prior
E2. Content of Consent Document
experience to make judgments on those
(a) The consent document shall
questions that are substantially more
contain the name and birthdate of the
reliable than judgments that would be
Indian child, the name of the Indian
made by nonexperts.
child's tribe, any identifying number or
The second subsection makes clear
other indication of the child's
that knowledge of tribal culture and
childrearing practices will frequently be membership in the tribe, if any, and the
name and address of the consenting
very valuable to the court Determining
parent or Indian custodian.
the likelihood of future harm frequently
(b) A consent to foster care placement
involves predicting future behavior—
shall contain, in addition to the
which is influenced to a large degree by
culture. Specific behavior patterns will
'information specified in (a), the name
often need to be placed in the context of and address of the person or entity by or
the total culture to determine whether
through whom the placement was
they are likely to cause serious
arranged, if any, or the name and
emotional harm.
address of the prospective foster
parents, if known at the time.
Indian tribes and Bureau of Indian
Affairs personnel frequently know
(c) A consent to termination of
persons who are knowledgeable
parentalrightsor adoption shall contain.
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in addition to the information specified
in (a), the name and address of the
person or entity by or through whom
any preadoptive or adoptive placement
has been or is to be arranged.
E.2. Commentary
This section specifies the basic
information about the placement or
termination to which the parent or
Indian custodian is consenting to assure
that consent is knowing and also to
document what took place.
E.3. Withdrawal of Consent to
Placement
Where a parent or Indian custodian
has consented to a foster care
placement under state law, such consent
may be withdrawn at any time by filing,
in the court where consent was
executed and filed, an instrument
executed by the parent or Indian
custodian. When a parent or Indian
custodian withdraws consent to foster
cure placement, the child shall as soon
38 is practicable be returned to that
parent or Indian custodian.
E.J. Commentary
This section specifies that withdrawal
of consent shall be filed in the same
court tvhere the consent document itself
was executed
E.4. Withdrawal of Consent to
Adoption
A consent to termination of parental
rights or adoption may be withdrawn by
the parent at any time prior to entry of a
final decree of voluntary termination or
adoption by filing in the court where the
consent is filed an instrument executed
under oath by the parent stipulating his
or her intention to withdraw such
consent. The clerk of the court where
the withdrawal of consent is filed shall
promptly notify the party by or through
whom any preadoptive or adoptive
placement has been arranged of such
filing and that party shall insure the
return of the child to the parent as soon
as practicable.
£.4. Commentary
This provision recommends that the
clerk of the court be responsible for
notifying the family with whom the child
has been placed that consent has been
withdrawn. The court's involvement
frequently may be necessary since the
biological parents are often not told who
the adoptive parents are.
F. Dispositions
F.l. Adoptive Placements
(a) In any adoptive placement of an
fndian child under state law preference
must be given [in the order listed below)

absent good cause to the contrary, to
fi) A member of the Indian child's
placement of the child with:
extended family:
(i) A member of the child's extended
(ii) A foster home, licensed approved
family:
or specified by the Indian child's tribe,
(ii) Other members of the Indian
whether on or off the reservation;
child's tribe: or
(iii) An Indian foster home licensed or
(iii) Other Indian families, including
approved by an authorized non-Indian
families of single parents.
licensing authority; or
(b) The Indian child's tribe may
(iv) An institution for children
establish a different order of preference
approved by an Indian tribe or operated
by resolution. That order of preference
by an Indian organization which has a
must be followed so long as placement
program suitable to meet the child's
is the least restrictive setting
needs.
appropriate to the child's needs,
(c) The Indian child's tribe may
(c) Unless a consenting parent
establish a different order of preference
evidences a desire for anonymity, the
by resolution, and that order of
court or agency shall notify the child's
preference shall be followed sc long as
extended family and the Indian child's
the criteria enumerated in subsection (a)
tribe that their members will be given
are met
preference in the adoption decision.
?X Commentary
F.l. Commentary
This guideline simply restates the
This section makes clear that
provisions
of the Act
preference shall be given in the order
listed in the Act, The Act clearly
F.3. Good Cause To Modify Preferences
recognizes the role of the child's
(a) For purposes of foster care,
extended family in helping to raise
children. The extended family should be preadoptive or adoptive placement, a
determination of good cause not to
looked tofirstwhen it becomes
follow the order of preference set out
necessary to remove the child from the
custody of his or her parents. Because of above shall be based on one or more of
the following considerations:
differences in cultures among tribes,
(i) The request of the biological
placement within the same tribe is
parents or the child when the child is of
preferable.
sufficient age.
This section also provides that single
(ii) The extraordinary physical or
parent families shall be considered for
emotional needs of the child as
placements. The legislative history of
established by testimony of a qualified
the Act makes it clear that Congress
expert witness.
intended custody decisions to be made
(iii) The unavailability of suitable
based on a consideration of the present
families for placement after a diligent
or potential custodian's ability to
search has been completed for families
provide the necessary care, supervision
meeting the preference criteria.
and support for the child rather than on
(b) Thk burden of establishing the
preconceived notions of proper family
existence of good cause not to follow
composition.
The third subsection recommends that the order of preferences established in
subsection (b) shall be on the party
the court or agent make an active effort
urging that the preferences not be
tofindout if there are families entitled
% followed.
to preference who would be willing to
adopt the child. This provision
F.3. Commentary
recognizes, however, that the consenting
The Act indicates that the court is to
parent's request for anonymity tajces
give
preference to confidentiality
precedence over efforts tofinda home
requests by parents in making
consistent with the Act's priorities.
placements. Paragraph (i) is intended to
F.2. Foster Care or Preadoptive
permit parents to ask that the order of
Placements
^preference not be followed because it
would prejudice confidentiality or for
In any foster care or preadoptive
other reasons. The wishes of an older
placement of an Indian child:
child are Important in making an
(a) The child must be placed in the
effective placement
least restrictive setting which
In a Tew cases a child may need
(i) most approximates a family;
highly specialized treatment services
(it) in which his or her special needs
that are unavailable in the community
may be met* and
where the families who meet the
(iii) which is in reasonable proximity
preference criteria live. Paragraph (ii)
to his or her home.
recommends that such considerations be
(b) Preference must be given in the
considered as good cause to the
following order, absent good cause to
contrary.
the contrary, to placement with:
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(c) Where state law prohibits
revelation of the identity of the
biological parent, assistance of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs shall be sought
where necessary to help an adoptee
who is eligible for membership in a tribe
establish thatrightwithout breaching
the confidentiality of the record.
G.2. Commentary
Subsection (b) makes clear that
adoptions completed prior to May 7,
1979, are covered by this provision. The
Act states that most portions of Title I
do not "affect a proceeding under State
law'* initiated or completed prior to May
7,1979. Providing information to an
adult adoptee, however, cannot be said
to affect the proceeding by which the
adoption was ordered
G. Post-Trial Rights
The legislative history of the Act
makes it clear that this Act was not
G.l. Petition To Vacate Adoption
intended to supersede the decision of
(a) Within two years after a final
state legislatures on whether adult
decree of adoption of any Indian child
adoptees may be told the names of their
by a state court, or within any longer * biological parents. The intent is simply
period of time permitted by the law of
to assure the protection of rights
the state, a parent who executed a
deriving from tribal membership. Where
consent to termination of paternal rights a state law prohibits disclosure of the
or adoption of that child may petition
identity of the biological parents, tribal
the court in which the final adoption
rights can be protected by asking the
decree was entered to vacate the decree BIA to check confidentially whether the
and revoke the consent on the grounds
adult adoptee meets the requirements
that such consent was obtained by fraud for membership in an Indian tribe. If the
or duress.
adoptee does meet those requirements,
(b) Upon thefilingof such petition, the the BIA can certify that fact to the
court shall give notice to all parties to
appropriate tribe.
the adoption proceedings and shall
G.3. Notice of Change in Child's Status
proceed to hold a hearing on the
petition. Where the court finds that the
(a) Whenever afinaldecree of
parent's consent was obtained through
adoption of an Indian child has been
fraud or duress, it must vacate the
vacated or set aside, or the adoptive
decree of adoption and order the
parent has voluntarily consented to the
consent revoked and order the child
termination of his or her parental rights
returned to the parent.
to the child or whenever an Indian child
is removedfroma foster care home or
G.l. Commentary
institution for the purpose of further
foster care, preadoptive placement, or ,
This section recommends that the
adoptive placement, notice by the court
petition to vacate an adoption be
or an agency authorized by the court
brought in the same court in which the
decree was entered, since that court
shall be given to the child's biological
clearly has jurisdiction, and witnesses
parents or prior Indian custodians. Such
on the issue of fraud or duress are most
notice shall inform the recipient of his or
likely to be within its jurisdiction.
herrightto petition for return of custody
of the child
G.2. Adult Adoptee Rights
(b) A parent or Indian custodian may
(a) Upon application by an Indian
waive his or herrightto such notice by
individual who has reached age 18 who
executing a written waiver of notice
was the subject of an adoptive
filed with the court Such waiver may be
placement, the court which entered the
revoked at any time by filing with the
final decree must inform such individual court a written notice of revocation, but
of the tribal affiliations, if any of the
such revocation would not affect any
individual's biological parents and
proceeding which occurred before the
provide such other information
filing of the notice of revocation.
necessary to protect anyrightsflowing
from the individual's tribal relationship. G.3. Commentary
(b) The section applies regardless of
Tills section provides guidelines to aid
courts in applying the provisions of
whether or not the original adoption
was subject to the provisions of the Act Section 100 of the Act Section 100 gives
Paragraph (iii] recommends that a
diligent attempt to find a suitable family
meeting the preference criteria be made
before consideration of a non-preference
placement be considered. A diligent
attempt tofinda suitable family
includes at a minimum, contact with the
child's tribal social service program, a
search of all county or state listings of
available Indian homes and contact
with nationally known Indian programs
with available placement resources.
Since Congress has established a
clear preference for placements within
the tribal culture, it is recommended in
subsection (b) that the party urging an
exception be made be required to bear
the burden of proving and exception is
necessary.
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legal standing to a biological parent or
prior Indian custodian to petition for
return of a child in cases of failed
adoptions or changes in placement in
situations where there has been a
termination of parental rights. Section
106(b) provides the whenever an Indian
child is removed from a foster care
home or institution for the purpose of
further foster care, preadoptive
placement, or adoptive placement, such
placement is to be in accordance with
the provisions of the Act—which
requires notice to the biological parents.
The Act is silent on the question of
whether a parent or Indian custodian
can waive therightto further notice.
Obviously, there will be cases in which
the biological parents will prefer not to
receive notice once their parental rights
have been relinquished or terminated
This section provides for such waivers
but because the Act establishes an
absoluterightto participate in any
future proceedings and to petition the
court for return of the child, the waiver
is revocable.
G.4. Maintenance of Records
The state shall establish a single
location where all records of every
foster care, preadoptive placement and
adoptive placement of Indian children
by courts of that state will be available
within seven days of a request by an
Indian child's tribe or the Secretary. The
records shall contain, at a minimum, the
petition or complaint, all substantive
orders entered in the proceeding, and
the complete record of the placement
determination.
G.4. Commentary
This section of the guidelines provides
a procedure for implementing the
provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e). This
section has been modified from the
previous version which required that all
records be maintained in a single
location within the state. As revised this
section provides only that the records be
retrievable by a single office that would
make them available to the requester
within seven days of a request For
some states (especially Alaska)
centralization of the records themselves
would create major administrative
burdens. So long as the records can be
promptly made available at a single
location, the intent of this section that
the records be readily available will be
satisfied
Forrest )• Gerard,
Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs.
November IS, 1979.
IPS Doe. 79-28231 Fltod 11-23-79; MS um\
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TITLE 25-INDIANS

Sec.
1922.

Emergency removal or placement of child;
termination: appropriate action.
1923.
Effective date.
SUBCHAPTER II-INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY
PROGRAMS
1931.
Grants for on or near reservation programs
and child welfare codes.
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of programs.
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or other Federal financial assistance programs;
assistance for such programs unaffected; State licensing or approval
for qualification for assistance
under federally assisted program.
1932.
Grants for off-reservation programs for additional services.
1933.
Funds for on and off reservation programs.
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health
and Human Services; appropriation
in advance for payments,
(b) Appropriation authorization under
section 13 of this title.
1934.
"Indian" defined for certain purposes.
SUBCHAPTER III-RECORDKEEPING. INFORMATION AVAILABILITY. AND TIMETABLES
1951.
Information availability to and disclosure by
Secretary.
(a) Copy of final decree or order, other
information; anonymity affidavit;
exemption from Freedom of Information Act.
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of Indian child in tribe or for
determination of member rights or
benefits; certification of entitlement to enrollment.
1952.
Rules and regulations.
SUBCHAPTER IV-MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
1961.
Education; day schools; report to congressional committees; particular consideration
of elementary grade facilities.
1962.
Omitted.
1963.
Severability of provisions.
CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHE* SECTIONS

This chapter is referred to in section 1727 of this
title.
§ 1901. Congressional finding*
Recognizing the special relationship between
the United States and the Indian tribes and
their members and the Federal responsibility to
Indian people, the Congress finds—
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the
United States Constitution provides that
"The Congress shall have Power • • • To regulate Commerce • • • with Indian tribes" and,
through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian
affairs;
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with
Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility
for the protection and preservation of Indian
tribes and their resources;
(3) that there is no resource that is more
vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children and that
the United States has a direct interest, as

trustee, in protecting Indian children who are
members of or are eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of
Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children from
them by nontribal public and private agencies
and that an alarmingly high percentage of
such children are placed in non-Indian foster
and adoptive homes and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the
essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in
Indian communities and families.
(Pub. L. 95-608. § 2, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.)
SHORT TITLE

Section 1 of Pub. L. 95-608 provided: "That this Act
[which enacted this chapterl may be cited as the
'Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978'."
§ 1902. Congressional declaration of policy
The Congress hereby declares that it is the
policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families
by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children
from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and
by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in
the operation of child and family service programs.
(Pub. L. 95-608, § 3, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.)
§ 1903. Definition!
For the purposes of this chapter, except as
may be specifically provided otherwise, the
term—
(1) "child custody proceeding" shall mean
and include—
(i) "foster care placement" which shall
mean any action removing an Indian child
from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian
cannot have the child returned upon
demand, but where parental rights have not
been terminated;
(ii) . "termination of parental rightr."
which shall mean any action resulting in
the termination of the parent-child relu- *
tionship;
(iii) "preadoptive placement" which shall
mean the temporary placement of an
Indian child in a foster home or institution
after the termination of parental rights, but
prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement;
and
(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall
mean the permanent placement of an
Indian child for adoption, including any
action resulting in a final decree of adoption.
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Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act which, if committed
by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon
an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody
to one of the parents.
(2) "extended family member" shall be as
defined by the law or custom of the Indian
child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or
custom, shall be a person who has reached
the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent;
(3) "Indian" means any person who is a
member of an Indian tribe, or who is an
Alaska Native and a member of a Regional
Corporation as defined in 1606 of title 43;
(4) "Indian child" means any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is
either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b)
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe;
(5) "Indian child's tribe" means (a) the
Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a
member or eligible for membership or (b), in
the case of an Indian child who is a member
of or eligible for membership in more than
one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the
Indian child has the more significant contacts;
(6) "Indian custodian" means any Indian
person who has legal custody of an Indian
child under tribal law or custom or under
State law or to whom temporary physical
care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child;
(7) "Indian organization" means any group,
association, partnership, corporation, or other
legal entity owned or controlled by Indians,
or a majority of whose members are Indians;
(8) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe,
band, nation, or other organized group or
community of Indians recognized as eligible
for the services provided to Indians by the
Secretary because of their status as Indians,
including any Alaska Native village as defined
in section 1602(c) of title 43;
(9) "parent" means any biological parent or
parents of an Indian child or any Indian
person who has lawfully adopted an Indian
child, including adoptions under tribal law or
custom. It does not include the unwed father
where paternity has not been acknowledged
or established;
(10) "reservation" means Indian country as
defined in section 1151 of title 18 and any
lands, not covered under such section, title to
which is either held by the United States in
trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United
States against alienation;
(11) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the
Interior; and
(12) "tribal court" means a court with jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and
which is either a Court of Indian Offenses, a
court established and operated under the
code or custom of an Indian tribe, or any
other administrative body of a tribe which is

§1911

vested with authority over child custody proceedings.
(Pub. L. 95-608. § 4. Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.)
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 1727 of this
title.
SUBCHAPTER I-CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS
§ 1911. Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction

An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides
or is domiciled within the reservation of such
tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.
Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal
court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.
(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal
court
In any State court proceeding for the foster
care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's
tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to
the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to
the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection
"by either parent, upon the petition of either
parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian
child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall
be subject to declination by the tribal court of
such tribe.
(c) State court proceedings; intervention

In any State court proceeding for the foster
care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian
of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall
have a right to intervene at any point in the
proceeding.
(d) Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of Indian tribes

The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and
every Indian tribe shall give full faith and
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to
Indian child custody proceedings to the same
extent that such entities give full faith and
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of any other entity.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 101. Nov. 8. 1978, 92
Stat. 3071.)
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHE* SECTIONS
This section is referred
1923 of this title.

to in sections 1914. 1918.
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§ 1912. Pending court proceedings
fa) Notice; time for commencement of proceedings;
additional time for preparation

In any involuntary proceeding in a State
court, where the court knows or has reason to
know that an Indian child is involved, the party
seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and
the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with
return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. If
the identity or location of the parent or Indian
custodian and the tribe cannot be determined,
such notice shall be given to the Secretary in
like manner, who shall have fifteen days after
receipt to provide the requisite notice to the
parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. No
foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least
ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or
Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secretary:
Provided, That the parent or Indian custodian
or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up
to twenty additional days to prepare for such
proceeding.
(b) Appointment of counsel
In any case in which the court determines indigency, the parent or Indian custodian shall
have the right to court-appointed counsel in
any removal, placement, or termination proceeding. The court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel for the child upon a finding that
such appointment is in the best interest of the
child. Where State law makes no provision for
appointment of counsel in such proceedings,
the court shall promptly notify the Secretary
upon appointment of counsel, and the Secretary, upon certification of the presiding judge,
shall pay reasonable fees and expenses out of
funds which may be appropriated pursuant to
section 13 of this title.
(c) Examination of reports or other documentt

Each party to a foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding under
State law involving an Indian child shall have
the right to examine all reports or other documents filed with the court upon which any decision with respect to such action may be based.
(d) Remedial services and rehabilitative programs;
preventive measures

Any party seeking to effect a foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights
to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy
the court that active efforts have been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family and that these efforts have
proved unsuccessful.
(e) Foster care placement orders; evidence; determination of damage to child
No foster care placement may be ordered in
such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert
witnesses, that the continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely

to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child.
(f) Parental rights termination orders; evidence; determination of damage to child
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 102, Nov. 8, 1978, 92
Stat. 3071.)
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHEK SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1914, 1916 of
this title.
§ 1913. Parental rights, voluntary termination
(a) Convent; record; certification matters; invalid consents

Where any parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or to
termination of parental rights, such consent
shall not be valid unless executed in writing
and recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the terms and
consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and were fully understood by
the parent or Indian custodian. The court shall
also certify that either the parent or Indian
custodian fully understood the explanation in
English or that it was interpreted into a language that the parent or Indian custodian understood. Any consent given prior to, or within
ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall
not be valid.
(b) Foster care placement; withdrawal of consent
Any parent or Indian custodian may withdraw consent to a foster care placement under
State law at any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent or
Indian custodian.
(c) Voluntary termination of parental rights or adoptive placement; withdrawal of consent; return of
custody
In any voluntary proceeding for termination
of parental rights to. or adoptive placement of,
an Indian child, the consent of the parent may
be withdrawn for any reason at any time prior
to the entry of a final decree of termination or
adoption, as the case may be, and the child
shall be returned to the parent.
4
(d) Collateral attack; vacation of decree and return of
custody; limitations
After the entry of a final decree of adoption
of an Indian child in any State court, the
parent may withdraw consent thereto upon the
grounds that consent was obtained through
fraud or duress and may petition the court to
vacate such decree. Upon a finding that such
consent was obtained through fraud or duress,
the court shall vacate such decree and return
the child to the parent. No adoption which has
been effective for at least two years may be in-
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validated under the provisions of this subsection unless otherwise permitted under State
law.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 103, Nov. 8, 1978, 92
Stat. 3072.)
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SFCTIONS

This section is referred to in section 1S14 of this
title.
§ 1914. Petition to court of competent jurisdiction to
invalidate action upon shoeing of certain violations
Any Indian child who is the subject of any
action for foster care placement or termination
of parental rights under State law, any parent
or Indian custodian from whose custody such
child was removed, and the Indian child's tribe
may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing
that such action violated any provision of sections 1911. 1912, and 1913 of this title.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I, § 104, Nov. 8, 1978, 92
Stat. 3072.)
§ 1915. Placement of Indian children
(a) Adoptive placements; preferences
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child
under State law, a preference shall be given, in
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a
placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.
(b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria;
preference!
Any child accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be placed in the least restrictive setting which most approximates a
family and in which his special needs, if any,
may be met. The child shall also be placed
within reasonable proximity to his or her
home, taking into account any special needs of
the child. In any foster care or preadoptive
placement, a preference shall be given, in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a
placement with—
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended,
family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or
specified by the Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing
authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by
an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to
meet the Indian child's needs.
(c) Tribal resolution for different order of preference;
personal preference considered; anonymity in application of preferences
In the case of a placement under subsection
(a) or (b) of this section, if the Indian child's
tribe shall establish a different order of preference by resolution, the agency or court effecting the placement shall follow such order so
long as the placement is t h e least restrictive
setting appropriate to the particular needs of
the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this

§1917

section. Where appropriate, the preference of
the Indian child or parent shall be considered:
Provided, That where a consenting parent evidences a desire for anonymity, the court or
agency shall give weight to such desire in applying the preferences.
(d) Social and cultural standards applicable
The standards to be applied in meeting the
preference requirements of this section shall he
the prevailing social and cultural standards of
the Indian community in which the parent jr
extended family resides or with which the
parent or extended family members maintain
social and cultural ties.
(e) Record of placement; availability
A record of each such placement, under State
law, of an Indian child shall be maintained by
the State in which the placement was made,
evidencing the efforts to comply with the order
of preference specified in this section. Such
record shall be made available at any time upon
the request of the Secretary or the Indian
child's tribe.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 105. Nov. 8, 1978, 92
Stat. 3073.)
§ 1916. Return of custody
(a) Petition; best interests of child
Notwithstanding State law to the contrary,
whenever a final decree of adoption of an
Indian child has been vacated or set aside or
the adoptive parents voluntarily consent to the
termination of their parental rights to the
child, a biological parent or prior Indian custodian may petition for return of custody and the
court shall grant such petition unless there is a
showing, in a proceeding subject to the provisions of section 1912 of this title, that such
return of custody is not in the best interests of
the child.
(b) Removal from foster care home; placement procedure
Whenever an Indian child is removed from a
foster care home or institution for the purpose
of further foster care, preadoptive. or adoptive
placement, such placement shall be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, except
in the case where an Indian child is being returned to the parent or Indian custodian from
whose custody the child was originally removed
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I, i 106. Nov. 8. 1978, 92
Stat. 3073.)
§ 1917. Tribal affiliation information and other information for protection of rights from tribal relationship: application of subject of adoptive placement; disclosure by court
Upon application by an Indian individual who
has reached the age of eighteen and who was
the subject of an adoptive placement, the court
which entered the final decree shall inform
such individual of the tribal affiliation, if any.
of the individual's biological parents and provide such other information as may be neces-
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sary to protect any rights flowing from the individual's tribal relationship.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title 1, § 107. Nov. 8. 1978. 92
Stat. 3073.)
§ 1918. Reassumption of jurisdiction over child custod> procerdings
(a) Petition: suitable plan; approval by Secretary

Any Indian tribe which became subject to
State jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of
the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as
amended by title IV of the Act of April 11, 1368
(82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any other Federal law, may rcassume jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe
may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings, such tribe shall present to
the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction.
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary;
partial retrocession
(1) In considering the petition and feasibility
of the plan of a tribe under subsection (a) of
this section, the Secretary may consider, among
other things:
(i) whether or not the tribe maintains a
membership roll or alternative provision for
clearly identifying the persons who will be affected by the reassumption of jurisdiction by
the tribe;
. (ii) the size of the reservation or former reservation area which will be affected by retrocession and reassumption of jurisdiction by
the tribe;
(iii) the population base of the tribe, or distribution of the population in homogeneous
communities or geographic areas; and
(iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of
multitribal occupation of a single reservation
or geographic area.
(2) In those cases where the Secretary determines that the jurisdictional provisions of section 1911(a) of this title are not feasible, he is
authorized to accept partial retrocession which
will enable tribes to exercise referral jurisdiction as provided in section 1911(b) of this title,
or. where appropriate, will allow them to exercise exclusive jurisdiction as provided in section
1911(a) of this title over limited community or
geographic areas without regard for the reservation status of the area affected.
(c) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Register, notice; reassumption period; correction of
causes for disapproval
If the Secretary approves any petition under
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary
shall publish notice of such approval in the
Federal Register and shall notify the affected
State or States of such approval. The Indian
tribe concerned shall reassume jurisdiction
sixty days after publication in the Federal Register of notice of approval. If the Secretary disapproves any petition under subsection (a) of
this section, the Secretary shall provide such
technical assistance as may be necessary to
enable the tribe to correct any deficiency which
the Secretary identified as a cause for disapproval.

INDIANS
(d) rending actions or proceedings unaffected

Assumption of jurisdiction under this section
shall not affect any action or proceeding over
which a court has already assumed jurisdiction,
except as may be provided pursuant to any
agreement under section 1919 of this title.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 108. Nov. 8, 1978. 92
Stat. 3074.)
RLFLPENCES IN TEXT

The Act of Aug. 15. 1953. referred to in s'jbsec. (a), is
act Aug. 15. 1953. ch. 505. 67 Slat. 538, as amended,
which t-nacttd section 1162 of Title 18, Crimes and
Criminal Procedure, section 1360 of Title 28. Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure, and provisions set out as notes
under section 1360 of Title 28. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1727. 1923 of
this litle.
§ 1919. Agreements between States and Indian tribes
(a) Subject coverage

States and Indian tribes are authorized to
enter into agreements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, including agreements which may provide for orderly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis and agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction between States and Indian
tribes.
(b) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaffected

Such agreements may be revoked by either
party upon one hundred and eighty days* written notice to the other party. Such revocation
shall not affect any action or proceeding over
which a court has already assumed jurisdiction,
unless the agreement provides otherwise.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I. § 109, Nov. 8, 1978, 92
Stat. 3074.)
SECTION

Rtrtfjua

TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1918, 1923 of
this title.
§ 1920. Improper removal of child from custody; declination of jurisdiction; forthwith return of child:
danger exception
*

Where any petitioner In an Indian child custody proceeding before a State court has Improperly removed the child from custody of the
parent or Indian custodian or has improperly
retained custody after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall
decline jurisdiction over such petition and shall
forthwith return the 'child to his parent or
Indian custodian unless returning the child to
his parent or custodian would subject the child
to a substantial and immediate danger or
threat of such danger.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 110. Nov. 8, 1978, 92
SUL 3075.)
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§ 191M. Higher State or Federal standard applicable to
protect rights of parent or Indian custodian of
Indian child
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State
or Federal law provides a higher standard of
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian
custodian of an Indian child than the rights
provided under this subchapter, the State or
Federal court shall apply the State or Federal
standard.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I, § 111, Nov. 8, 1978. 92
Stat. 3075.)
§ 1^22. Emergency removal or placement of child; termination; appropriate action
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to prevent the emergency removal of an Indian
child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a
reservation, but temporarily located off the reservation, from his parent or Indian custodian
or the emergency placement of such child in a
foster home or institution, under applicable
State Jaw, in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. The State authority, official, or agency involved shall insure
that the emergency removal or placement terminates immediately when such removal or
placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child
and shall expeditiously initiate a child custody
proceeding subject to the provisions of this subchapter, transfer the child to the jurisdiction of
the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the
child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may
be appropriate.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I. § 112. Nov. 8, 1978, 92
Stat. 3075.)
§1923, Effective date
None of the provisions of this subchapter,
except sections 1911(a). 1918. and 1919 of this
title, shall affect a proceeding under State law
for foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive
Placement which was initiated or completed
prior to one hundred and eighty days after November 8, 1978, but shall apply to any subsequent proceeding in the same matter or subsequent proceedings affecting the custody or
Placement of the same child.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I. 1113. Nov. 8. 1978, 92
Stat. 3075.)
SUBCHAPTER I I - I N D I A N CHILD AND
FAMILY PROGRAMS
91931. Grants for on or near reservation program!
and child welfare codes
(

a) Statement of purpose; scope of program*
The Secretary is authorized to make grants to
Indian tribes and organizations in the establishment and operation of Indian child and family
service programs on or near reservations and in
the preparation and implementation of child
welfare codes. The objective of every Indian
child and family service program shall be to
Prevent the breakup of Indian families and. in

particular, to insure that the permanent removal of an Indian child from the custody of his
parent or Indian custodian shall be a last
resort. Such child and family s e n ice programs
may include, but are not limited to—
(1) a system for licensing or otherwise regulating Indian foster and adoptive homes;
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities for the counseling and treatment of
Indian families and for the temporary custody of Indian children;
(3) family assistance, including homemaker
and home counselors, day care, afterschool
care, and employment, recreational activities,
and respite care;
(4) home improvement programs;
(5) the employment of professional and
other trained personnel to assist the tribal
court in the disposition of domestic relations
and child welfare matters;
(6) education and training of Indians, including tribal court judges and staff, in skills
relating to child and family assistance and
service programs;
(7) a subsidy program under which Indian
adoptive children may be provided support
comparable to that for which they would be
eligible as foster children, taking into account
the appropriate State standards of support
for maintenance and medical needs; and
(8) guidance, legal representation, and
advice to Indian families involved in tribal,
State, or Federal child custody proceedings.
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or other Federal financial assistance programs; assistance for such programs unaffected;
State licensing or approval for qualification for
assistance under federally assisted program
Funds appropriated for use by the Secretary
in accordance with this section may be utilized
as non-Federal matching share in connection
with funds provided under titles IV-B and X X
of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 620 et seq.,
1397 et seq.] or under any other Federal financial assistance programs which contribute to
the purpose for which such funds are authorized to be appropriated for use under this chapter. The provision or possibility of assistance
under this chapter shall not be a basis for the
denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise
authorized under titles IV-B and X X of the
Social Security Act or any other federally assisted program. For purposes of qualifying for
assistance under a federally assisted program,
licensing or approval of foster or adoptive
homes or institutions by an Indian tribe shall
be deemed equivalent to licensing or approval
by a State.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title II, § 201. Nov. 8, 1978. 92
Stat, 3075.)
RlfEHENCTS III T.EXT

The Social Security Act. referred to in subsec. (b), is
act Aug. 14. 1935. ch. 531. 49 Stat 620. as amended.
Title* IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act are
classified generally to part B <|620 et seq.) of subchapter IV and subchapter XX (f 13S7 et seq.) of chapter 7 of Title 42. The Pubhc Health and Welfare. For
complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tablet.
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§ 1932. Grants for off-re^enation programs for additional services
The Secretary is also authorized to make
grants to Indian organizations to establish and
operate off-reservation Indian child and family
service programs which may include, but are
not limited to —
(1) a system for regulating, 'maintaining,
and supporting Indian foster and adoptive
homes, including a subsidy program under
which Indian adoptive children may be provided support comparable to that for which
they would be eligible as Indian foster children, taking into account the appropriate
State standards of support for maintenance
and medical needs;
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities and services for counseling and treatment
of Indian families and Indian foster and adoptive children;
(3) family assistance, including homemaker
and home counselors, day care, afterschool
care, and employment, recreational activities,
and respite care; and
(4) guidance, legal representation, and
advice to Indian families involved in child custody proceedings.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title II. §202. Nov. 8. 1978. 92
Stat. 3076.)
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 1934 of this
title.
§ 1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health and Human Services; appropriation in ad\ance for payments
In the establishment, operation, and funding
of Indian child and family service programs,
both on and off reservation, the Secretary may
enter into agreements with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, and the latter Secretary is hereby authorized for such purposes
to use funds appropriated for similar programs
of the Department of Health and Human Services: Provided, That authority to make payments pursuant to such agreements shall be effective only to the extent and in such amounts
as may be provided in advance by appropriation
Acts.
(b) Appropriation authorization under section 13 of
this title
Funds for the purposes of this chapter may
be appropriated pursuant to the provisions of
section 13 of this title.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title II. { 203, Nov. 8. 1978. 92
Stat. 3076; Pub. L. 96-88. title V. § 509(b). Oct.
17, 1979. 93 Stat. 695.)
CHANGE or NAME

"Secretary of Health and Human Services" and "Department of Health and Human Services" were substituted for "Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare" and "Department of Health. Education, and
Welfare", respectively, in subsec. (a) pursuant to section 50S:b> of Pub. L. 96-88. which is classified to section 3508(b) of Title 20. Education.

SECTION REFFRRLD TO IN OTHEP SFCTIONS

This section is referred to in action 1934 of this
title.
§ 1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes
For the purposes of sections 1932 and 1933 of
this title, the term "Indian" shall include persons defined in section K)03'c) of this title.
(Pub. L. 95-608. title II. §204, Nov. 8, 1978. 92
Slat. 3077.)
SUBCHAPTKR III KKCOKIJKKKPING. INFORMATION AVAILAHlU'i Y. AND TIMETABLES
§ 1 **,>!. Information availability to and disclo>ure by
Secretary
(a> Copy of final decree or order; other information;
anonymity affidavit; exemption from Freedom of
Information Act
Any State court entering a final decree or
order in any Indian child adoptive placement
after November 8. 1978, shall provide the Secretary with a copy of such decree or order together with such other information as may be necessary to show—
(1) the name and tribal affiliation of the
child;
(2) the names and addresses of the biological parents;
(3) the names and addresses of the adoptive
parents; and
(4) the identity of any agency having files
or information relating to such adoptive
placement.
Where the court records contain an affidavit of
the biological parent or parents that their identity remain confidential, the court shall include
such affidavit with the other information. The
Secretary shall insure that the confidentiality
of such information is maintained and such information shall not be subject to the Freedom
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), as amended.
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of
Indian child in tribe or for determination of
member rights or benefits; certification of entitlement to enrollment
Upon the request of the adopted Indian child
over the age of eighteen, the adoptive or foster
parents of an Indian child, or an Indian tribei
the Secretary shall disclose such information as
may be necessary for the enrollment of an
Indian child in the tribe in which the child may
be eligible for enrollment or for determining
any rights or benefits associated with that
membership. Where the documents relating to
such child contain an affidavit from the biological parent or parents requesting anonymity, the
Secretary shall certify to the Indian child's
tribe, where the information warrants, that the
child's parentage and other circumstances of
birth entitle the child to enrollment under the
criteria established by such tribe.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title III. § 301. Nov. 8. 1978. 92
StaU 3077.)
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§ 1952. Rules and regulations
Within one h u n d r e d and eighty days after
November 8, 1978. t h e Secretary shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out t h e provisions of this chapter.
(Pub. L. 95-608, title III. §302. Nov. 8. 1978. 92
Stat. 3077.)
S U B C H A P T E R IV -MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
§ 1961. Education; day schools; report to congressional committees: particular consideration of elementary grade facilities
(a) It is t h e sense of Congress t h a t the absence of locally convenient day schools may
contribute to t h e b r e a k u p of Indian families.
(b) Omitted
(Pub. L. 95-608, title IV, § 401. Nov. 8. 1978, 92
Stat. 3078.)
CODIFICATION

Subsec. (b), which required the Secretary, in consultation with agencies in the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, to report on the feasibility of
providing Indian children with schools located near
their homes and to submit the report to specific committees of the House of Representatives and Senate
within two years from Nov. 8, 1978. uas oinitted from
the Code as executed.
§ 1962. Omitted
CoDiriCATiow
Section. Pub. L 95-608. title IV. §402, Nov. 8. 1978,
92 Stat. 3078. which provided that within sixty days
after Nov. 8. 1978, the Secretary of the Interior send
to the Governor, chief justice of the highest court of
appeal, and the attorney general of each State a copy
of this chapter, together with committee reports and
an explanation of the provisions of this chapter, was
omitted from the Code as executed.
§ J963. Severability of provisions
If any provision of this chapter or t h e applicability thereof is held invalid, t h e remaining
provisions of this c h a p t e r shall not be affected
thereby.
<Pub. L. 95-608. title IV, §403. Nov. 8. 1978. 92
Stat. 3078.)
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